University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law
2005

Managing Gerrymandering
Mitchell N. Berman
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, Election Law Commons, Legal
Commons, Legal History Commons, Legal Theory Commons, Policy History, Theory, and Methods
Commons, Political History Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons

Repository Citation
Berman, Mitchell N., "Managing Gerrymandering" (2005). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 1470.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1470

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu.

Managing Gerrymandering
Mitchell N. Berman*
I.

II.

III.

IV.

V.

The Legal Landscape ................................................................................................... 785
A. Prehistory ........................................................................................................... 786
B.
Bandemer ........................................................................................................... 794
C.
Vieth................................................................................................................... 797
1.
The Dissents ............................................................................................. 799
2.
The Plurality ............................................................................................. 802
3.
The Concurrence....................................................................................... 807
Two Problems of Manageability .................................................................................. 809
A. The Meanings of Excessive Partisanship............................................................ 814
1.
Two Scalar Measures of Partisanship ....................................................... 815
2.
Two Baselines for Measurement............................................................... 818
B.
Three Wrong Turns ............................................................................................ 820
1.
The Specter of Proportional Representation ............................................. 820
2.
Fairness in Districting............................................................................... 821
3.
Compactness Fetishists ............................................................................. 823
C.
A Solution .......................................................................................................... 825
From Meaning to Doctrine........................................................................................... 828
A. Operative Propositions and Decision Rules........................................................ 830
B.
The Ubiquity of Nonstandard Decision Rules. ................................................... 832
C.
Decision Rules and Justiciability........................................................................ 836
Partisan Gerrymandering Doctrine............................................................................... 838
A. A Wholesale Decision Rule................................................................................ 838
B.
Some Retail Decision Rules ............................................................................... 844
1.
Mid-decade Redestricting ......................................................................... 845
2.
Departures from a Bipartisan Status Quo.................................................. 852
3.
Disparate Shacking ................................................................................... 853
Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 853

Political scientists, legal scholars, and engaged citizens have railed
against partisan gerrymandering for decades, if not centuries. This is not
surprising, for, as the critics often observe, the core principle of republican
government is that the voters should choose their representatives, not the
other way around.1 And yet a majority of the Supreme Court was largely

* Copyright © 2005 Mitchell N. Berman. Bernard J. Ward Centennial Professor in Law, The
University of Texas at Austin. Email: mberman@mail.law.utexas.edu. I am indebted to Micah
Altman, Renea Hicks, Sam Hirsch, Sam Issacharoff, Douglas Laycock, and Larry Sager for
extremely helpful conversations and comments on an earlier draft and to Chris Macleod for
excellent research assistance. I am also grateful to the editors of the Texas Law Review, especially
Nick Bunch and Arthur D’Andrea, for their flexibility and good humor.
1. See, e.g., Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 516 (E.D. Tex. 2004) (Ward, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (remarking that “extreme partisan gerrymandering leads to a system
in which the representatives choose their constituents, rather than vice-versa”), vacated and
remanded by Am. G.I. Forum of Tex. v. Perry, No. 03-1396, 2004 WL 759440 (U.S. Oct. 18, 2004),
Henderson v. Perry, No. 03-9644, 2004 WL 729280 (U.S. Oct. 18, 2004), Jackson v. Perry, No. 03-
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deaf to these criticisms before its 1986 holding, in Davis v. Bandemer,2 that
claims of unconstitutional partisan gerrymanders would be justiciable. In so
doing, however, the Bandemer Court announced such a demanding test for
adjudicating gerrymandering challenges that no claims have succeeded in the
nearly two decades that have ensued.
Last spring, in Vieth v. Jubelirer,3 the Court entertained its first partisan
gerrymandering claim since Bandemer. Unfortunately, commentators who
had hoped that Vieth would bring greater sense and order to the field were
disappointed. To be sure, Vieth did advance the ball in one critical respect:
For the first time, all nine Justices agreed that excessive partisanship in
redistricting is unconstitutional.4 All Justices also agreed that the Bandemer
test was infirm.5 Beyond that, however, Vieth created uncertainty. Even
while acknowledging that excessive partisanship in redistricting does offend
the Constitution, a four-member plurality of the Court would have overruled
Bandemer by holding claims of partisan gerrymandering nonjusticiable for
want of a judicially manageable standard.6 Four other Justices steadfastly
defended Bandemer’s holding as to justiciability, but proposed three separate
tests, in three separate opinions, to replace the Bandemer approach that they
agreed must go.7 Justice Kennedy stood alone in the middle.8 With the
plurality, he expressed skepticism that a manageable standard could be
devised,9 but, decrying the dangers of excessive partisanship, he also
declared his reluctance to reach that conclusion prematurely.10 “If workable
standards do emerge,” he insisted, “courts should be prepared to order
relief.”11
Although the uncertainty that Vieth has bequeathed is unfortunate, it is
not wholly unexpected. The chief message of the decision, after all, is that
crafting judicially manageable tests for administering a ban on extreme forms
of partisan gerrymandering is hard work. And we’ve known that for
generations; surely, few observers believed that Bandemer had solved the
1391, 2004 WL 759434 (U.S. Oct. 18, 2004), Lee v. Perry, No. 03-1399, 2004 WL 759443 (U.S.
Oct. 18, 2004), and Travis County v. Perry, No. 03-1400, 2004 WL 759444 (U.S. Oct. 18, 2004);
see also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769, 1807 n.25 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (claiming that
the architect of a gerrymandered map selects the constituencies and, in effect, the representatives).
2. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
3. 124 S. Ct. 1769 (2004).
4. See infra subpart I(C).
5. See infra subpart I(C).
6. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1778, 1784 (plurality opinion).
7. Id. at 1799 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 1815 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 1822 (Breyer,
J., dissenting). But see infra note 125 (noting the fundamental agreement shared by all of the
dissenters).
8. Id. at 1792 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
9. Id. at 1793 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
10. Id. at 1799 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
11. Id.

2005]

Managing Gerrymandering

783

problem. So Vieth reinforces what has long been clear—that the great
challenge is to craft judicially manageable standards for adjudicating claims
of unconstitutionally partisan gerrymandering. Despite all the ink that legal
scholars and political scientists have spilled on this very question, most
extant proposals appear unsatisfactory for one of two reasons: Because the
tests proposed are not manageable (such as the “predominant intent” test
floated by Justice Stevens),12 or because, even if manageable, they are not
clearly relevant to the constitutional violation (such as tests put forth by
political scientists that depend upon compactness measures or swing ratios).13
This Article tries to rectify some of these deficiencies. Taking as a
given that excessive pursuit of partisan advantage violates the Constitution,14
it explores how judge-made constitutional doctrine should be crafted to
administer this constitutional prohibition. Very generally, I argue that the
task ought to proceed in three steps. First, courts need to elaborate on the
notion of excessive partisanship as a matter of constitutional meaning.
Second, courts must appreciate the logical structure of constitutional
adjudication, i.e., the relationship between constitutional meaning and
constitutional doctrine. Third—and not sooner—courts should turn to
political scientists for help crafting manageable constitutional doctrine to
administer the constitutional meaning of excessive partisanship, as that
meaning has been fleshed out in step one. This recipe may appear obvious to
some readers. It is not, however, how contributors to the literature have
tended to proceed.
The structure of this Article roughly corresponds to those three steps.
Part I sets the table by providing a thumbnail history of the Court’s grappling
with partisan gerrymandering, culminating in a detailed review of the fractured opinions in Vieth. The remaining three Parts then confront the
challenge of crafting a judicially manageable test for administering the
(Vieth-recognized) constitutional prohibition against excessive partisanship
in redistricting. Part II elaborates on this constitutional meaning by
clarifying the very notion of “excessive partisanship.” Part III distinguishes
12. Id. at 1809–10 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
13. See, e.g., Richard G. Niemi, The Swing Ratio as a Measure of Partisan Gerrymandering, in
POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS 171, 176 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1990)
(suggesting that one crucial issue in gerrymandering cases should be “whether the swing ratio
associated with a particular plan is particularly low in comparison with historical experience in the
jurisdiction in question”).
14. In making this assumption, I do not mean to suggest that it is self-evidently correct. Still
less do I claim that, if the proposition is true, the reasons why it is true are obvious. For one brief
yet suggestive sketch of some of the evils that partisan gerrymandering causes, see Daniel D. Polsby
& Robert D. Popper, The Third Criterion: Compactness as a Political Safeguard Against Partisan
Gerrymandering, 9 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 301, 304–09 (1991). For a skeptical account, see Larry
Alexander, Lost in the Political Thicket, 41 FLA. L. REV. 563 (1989). Nonetheless, given the views
expressed in Vieth, the assumption in the text is surely one that a constitutional lawyer may
justifiably indulge.
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between judicial elucidations of constitutional meaning and the “decision
rules” that tell courts whether the dictates of constitutional meaning are
satisfied in a given case, to explain how the Court can move from this fuller
understanding of constitutional meaning to manageable constitutional
doctrine. Part IV proposes possible decision rules that courts might craft that
would sensibly administer the constitutional prohibition against excessive
partisanship in redistricting.
Such decision rules can come in both wholesale and retail variants—that
is, a rule could be designed either to cover all claims of unconstitutionally
excessive partisanship in redistricting or to address only certain fact
situations describable with fair particularity. Accordingly, Part IV offers the
skeleton of one wholesale, or one-size-fits-all, decision rule.
But,
recognizing the possible attractiveness of a more minimalist approach to this
thorny problem, it also offers a few retail decision rules tailored to subclasses
of redistricting cases in which excessive partisanship might be present. One
such subclass is represented by the notorious, mid-decade Texas
gerrymander enacted in the fall of 2003. Although avowedly and
egregiously partisan,15 the redistricting was upheld in Session v. Perry by a
three-judge district court applying Bandemer.16 Last October, however, the
Supreme Court vacated the lower court’s ruling and remanded for further
proceedings in light of Vieth.17 With an eye toward this especially important
litigation—important for the stakes immediately at issue and because of its
unusually high profile and symbolic salience—Part IV recommends a
decision rule that directs courts to conclude that mid-decade redistrictings
undertaken by a single-party-controlled state government are motivated by
excessive partisanship—hence are unconstitutional—unless narrowly tailored
to achieve a compelling interest. This is a manageable test that bears an
appropriate relationship to the evil of “excessive partisanship,” properly
understood.
*

*

*

In the immediate aftermath of Vieth, federal courts’ first task will be to
flesh out the meaning of “excessive partisanship.” They then must endeavor

15. Two commentators, not both known to be Democratic loyalists, deemed the Texas effort
“about as partisan as they come.” Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, Let’s Mess With
Texas, 82 TEXAS L. REV. 1587, 1616 (2004).
16. 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 457 (E.D. Tex. 2004).
17. Am. G.I. Forum of Tex. v. Perry, No. 03-1396, 2004 WL 759440 (U.S. Oct. 18, 2004);
Henderson v. Perry, No. 03-9644, 2004 WL 729280 (U.S. Oct. 18, 2004); Jackson v. Perry, No. 031391, 2004 WL 759434 (U.S. Oct. 18, 2004); Lee v. Perry, No. 03-1399, 2004 WL 759443 (U.S.
Oct. 18, 2004); Travis County v. Perry, No. 03-1400, 2004 WL 759444 (U.S. Oct. 18, 2004) (all
vacating and remanding Session v. Perry, 298 F.Supp. 2d 451 (E.D. Tex. 2004)).
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to craft suitable decision rules—whether broad or narrow, wholesale or
retail—to implement that meaning. If the courts miss this opportunity, one
might reasonably fear that the promise of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in
Vieth will go unfulfilled. So these early cases—Session notably among
them—are critical for the future of partisan gerrymandering. And if the most
heated critiques of the practice are to be credited, they are therefore of
fundamental importance to the health of American democracy.
But the post-Vieth round of gerrymandering challenges bear an
additional significance. In searching for a judicially manageable standard to
administer the constitutional prohibition on excessive partisanship in
districting, the Court is also struggling with the conceptual or logical
structure of constitutional adjudication. Vieth makes unusually clear that the
constitutional meaning that the Court discerns need not be identical to the incourt constitutional doctrine that the Court crafts to administer that meaning.
This is obvious and (I will argue) inescapable. It is high time for the Court to
face up to this fact forthrightly.18 A more sophisticated understanding of the
relationship between meaning and doctrine will help point the way toward a
workable solution to the problem of unconstitutional gerrymandering. At the
same time, a sincere search for such a solution can facilitate a more mature
appreciation of the relationship between meaning and doctrine. This Article,
accordingly, aims both to contribute to the jurisprudence of partisan
gerrymandering and to strengthen our collective understanding of the logical
structure of constitutional adjudication.
I.

The Legal Landscape

Partisan gerrymandering is not new. The very term “gerrymander” is
nearly 200 years old—having been coined in 1812 in reference to
Massachusetts Governor Elbridge Gerry and the salamander-like district he
helped to create—and the practice much older still.19 For generations,
however, the federal courts refused, on “political question” grounds, to police
either gerrymandering or its close cousin, malapportionment.20 This Part
reviews the Court’s pathbreaking decision, in Davis v. Bandemer,21 to hold
18. That the Court has not yet done this is perhaps best exemplified by the striking failure of a
seven-member majority in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), to clarify, in response
to a fiery Scalia dissent, see id. at 454 (Scalia, J., dissenting), how Court-crafted constitutional
doctrine can be legitimate, and resistant to change by Congress, without being constitutionally
required. For elaboration of this point, see Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90
VA. L. REV. 1, 18–29 (2004) [hereinafter Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules].
19. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769, 1774–75 (2004) (providing a thumbnail history
along with citations to relevant scholarship).
20. Malapportionment involves the creation or preservation of electoral districts of different
population sizes, so that the ratio of representatives to voters varies across districts. Gerrymanders
can involve districts of roughly equivalent, even equal, population sizes.
21. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
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gerrymandering claims justiciable. It then examines the Vieth decision in
some detail. First, though, it offers a nutshell summary of the road to
Bandemer. One lesson to be drawn from that narrative, simplified though it
is, will be that the Court’s determination in Bandemer to try to police
partisan gerrymandering was not the sudden innovation that Bandemer’s
critics often suggest. To the contrary, it was the predictable and hard-toresist outgrowth of a concern with the practice that had been deepening at the
Court for a generation.
A. Prehistory
The story, in outline, is familiar.22 It starts, customarily, in 1946 with
Colegrove v. Green,23 “the Court’s last, and possibly most strident, refusal to
become involved in cases of malapportionment or gerrymandering.”24 The
Colegrove plaintiffs had sought an injunction against the holding of
congressional elections under Illinois’s districting scheme, which had not
been modified since 1901 and had entrenched massive population
inequalities between districts.25 Writing for a divided Court,26 Justice
Frankfurter rejected the plaintiffs’ plea for judicial intervention, reasoning
that Article I, § 4 of the Constitution entrusted apportionment matters
entirely to Congress.27 “To sustain this action would cut very deep into the
very being of Congress,” Frankfurter wrote. “Courts ought not to enter this
political thicket. The remedy for unfairness in districting is to secure State
legislatures that will apportion properly, or to invoke the ample powers of
Congress.”28

22. For additional overviews, with which this summary is broadly consistent, see, for example,
Gordon E. Baker, The Unfinished Reapportionment Revolution, in POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING
AND THE COURTS, supra note 13, at 11 [hereinafter Baker, Unfinished Reapportionment
Revolution]; Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of
Political Fairness, 71 TEXAS L. REV. 1643, 1647–60 (1993) [hereinafter Issacharoff, Elusive
Quest].
23. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
24. MARK E. RUSH, DOES REDISTRICTING MAKE A DIFFERENCE: PARTISAN REPRESENTATION
AND ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR 16 (1993).
25. Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 550–51 (plurality opinion).
26. Only two other justices joined Justice Frankfurter’s opinion for the Court; a fourth, Justice
Rutledge, concurred only in the result. The three remaining Justices on the case—Black, Douglas,
and Murphy—dissented forcefully on Equal Protection grounds, noting the remedy suggested by
Frankfurter—the ballot box—was illusory precisely because of the extreme malapportionment. See
id. at 569 (Black, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 552–54 (plurality opinion).
28. Id. at 556 (plurality opinion).
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Colegrove was abandoned sixteen years later29 when, in Baker v. Carr,
the Court considered a challenge to another malapportionment resulting from
continued reliance on a 1901 state statute and held that such cases were
justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause.30 After noting that the political
question doctrine “is primarily a function of the separation of powers,”31
Justice Brennan harvested from prior cases six indicators of a nonjusticiable
political question:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment
of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the
respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question.32
Although the presence of any single factor in a particular case would
justify dismissal,33 Brennan argued that none was present so as to prevent the
Court from adjudicating malapportionment claims.34 In so arguing, he
29. That Colegrove had become more fragile was perhaps suggested two years before Baker
when, in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), the Court invalidated an Alabama statute that
retooled the municipal boundaries of Tuskegee to exclude all but a handful of black voters.
Plaintiffs challenged this gerrymander, alleging that the legislature’s creation of this “uncouth
twenty-eight-sided figure” violated the Due Process Clause, Equal Protection Clause, and the
Fifteenth Amendment. Id. at 340. Confronted by this outrage, not even Justice Frankfurter would
counsel judicial restraint. Writing again for the Court, Frankfurter sidestepped the Fourteenth
Amendment claims but agreed that the gerrymander abridged the Fifteenth Amendment by stripping
black citizens of their right to vote. Id. at 345. But the difficulty with this analysis, as Robert Dixon
explained,
is that it does not fit the facts. Negro voters affected by shrinking of Tuskegee’s
boundaries could still vote in all elections except city elections. . . . They were the
victims of a racially motivated action and were, of course, aggrieved. But their generic
complaint was not that there was an impairment of “voting rights” in the conventional
sense of the term. Rather, they were being excluded from the city by state action
impermissibly grounded on race.
ROBERT G. DIXON, JR., DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND
POLITICS 117 (1968); see also Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 348 (Douglas, J., concurring) (asserting that
Justice Black’s Colegrove equal protection dissent ought to control); id. at 349 (Whittaker, J.,
concurring) (also rejecting the Fifteenth Amendment claim in favor of the equal protection one).
Gomillion, in short, provided some further evidence that the political thicket might prove
irresistible.
30. 369 U.S. 186, 201 (1962).
31. Id. at 210.
32. Id. at 217.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 226.
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specifically asserted that such intervention would not mire the courts in
controversies which they were incompetent to resolve. “Judicial standards
under the Equal Protection Clause are well developed and familiar,” Brennan
insisted, “and it has been open to courts since the enactment of the
Fourteenth Amendment to determine, if on the particular facts they must, that
a discrimination reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious
action.”35 But the Court stopped short of providing lower courts with any
greater direction in applying this vague standard.
Justice Clark’s concurrence scolded the Court precisely for refusing to
articulate detailed standards for malapportionment claims.36 But the most
withering criticism came in thundering dissents by Justices Frankfurter and
Harlan. Frankfurter berated the majority for “asserting destructively novel
judicial power” in a “massive repudiation of the experience of our whole
past” and also warned that the Court’s entry into the political thicket was
doomed to failure.37 The Court’s lofty pronouncements on the sanctity of
voting rights would eventually be exposed, he predicted, as “merely empty
rhetoric, sounding a word of promise to the ear, sure to be disappointing to
the hope.”38 Justice Harlan was equally skeptical, arguing pointedly that
because the claim concerned the apportionment of a state legislature, the
Equal Protection Clause had no room to operate unless the state’s apportionment method was wholly irrational. Here, Harlan insisted, Tennessee could
reasonably determine that legislative apportionment by geographic region
best balanced the diverse interests of the state’s citizens.39
Notwithstanding these vigorous dissents, the Court immediately set
itself to making good on Baker’s promise by announcing a test to govern
malapportionment claims. The now familiar one-person, one-vote rule arose
from a trio of cases decided in 1963 and 1964—Gray v. Sanders,40 Wesberry
v. Sanders,41 and Reynolds v. Sims.42
Gray invalidated Georgia’s county-unit primary system for electing
statewide officers, rejecting a vote-weighing mechanism similar to the
federal electoral college.43 The system significantly diluted the votes of
those living in more populated counties and, despite some last-minute
tinkering by the legislature,44 the Court held that once a state had set voter

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Id. at 251 (Clark, J., concurring).
Id. at 267 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 270 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 334 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
372 U.S. 368 (1963).
376 U.S. 1 (1964).
377 U.S. 533 (1964).
372 U.S. at 376–78.
Id. at 372.
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eligibility requirements, it could not then weight some votes more heavily
than others without violating equal protection.45 “The conception of political
equality,” Justice Douglas wrote for the Court, “can mean only one thing—
one person, one vote.”46 Wesberry v. Sanders condemned similar population
disparities between Georgia’s congressional districts.47 Because the suit
challenged congressional districting rather than state legislative
apportionment, the Court grounded the one-person, one-vote rule in Article I,
§ 2 rather than the Equal Protection Clause.48 The basic rule, however, was
the same: “[A]s nearly as is practicable,” the Court insisted, “one man’s vote
in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another’s.”49
Reynolds v. Sims,50 decided four months later, involved a challenge to
state legislative districts and therefore, like Gray, involved the Equal
Protection Clause, not Article I, § 2. But a majority held that the Wesberry
rule applied here too—a state must “make an honest and good faith effort to
construct districts, in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal
population as is practicable.”51 However, Chief Justice Warren explained,
“some distinctions may well be made between congressional and state
legislative representation.”52 Most particularly, the Court discerned reasons
why it might be more important in the latter context for legislatures to try to
maintain the integrity of political subdivisions. “Somewhat more flexibility
may therefore be constitutionally permissible with respect to state legislative
apportionment than in congressional districting,” it concluded.53 A contrary
rule, it recognized, might produce more harm than good, for
“[i]ndiscriminate districting, without any regard for political subdivision or
natural or historical boundary lines, may be little more than an open
invitation to partisan gerrymandering.”54 This was small consolation to
Justice Harlan, who in dissent charged that, by forceclosing state reliance on
traditional districting factors, the Court had left states with few other
options.55
45. Id. at 379–81.
46. Id. at 381.
47. 376 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1964).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
51. Id. at 577.
52. Id. at 578.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 578–79. Some commentators read this passage as expressing the majority’s belief
that one-person, one-vote could forestall partisan gerrymandering. See, e.g., Issacharoff, Elusive
Quest, supra note 22, at 1648 & n.29. I read it, in contrast, to reflect the majority’s recognition that
too stringent reliance on one-person, one-vote could indeed provoke legislatures to gerrymander by
withdrawing from them the option of drawing lines in a way that would respect the interests of
political subdivisions—an option that Chief Justice Warren, perhaps naively, seemed to suppose
that legislatures would prefer were it open to them.
55. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 622–23 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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The Reynolds Justices were, therefore, clearly conscious of the problem
of partisan gerrymandering, even as they directly engaged with the
analytically distinct problem of malapportionment. Because the practice of
judicial review consistently favors rules over standards, however, a majority
of the Court proceeded over the course of the decade to tighten the oneperson, one-vote rule from a guideline into something closer to a
straightjacket—especially in congressional districting.56 Predictably, this
development spawned a concomitantly growing worry among a minority of
Justices that the Court was thereby opening the door wide for precisely the
gerrymandering that even the Reynolds majority had warned against.
The rulings in Kirkpatrick v. Preisler57 and Wells v. Rockefeller,58
handed down on the same day in 1969, highlighted the dispute. In
Kirkpatrick, the Court clarified Wesberry’s “as nearly as practicable”
standard for congressional apportionment, holding that “the command of Art.
I, § 2, that States create congressional districts which provide equal
representation for equal numbers of people permits only the limited
population variances which are unavoidable despite a good-faith effort to
achieve absolute equality, or for which justification is shown.”59 According
to Justice Brennan, Missouri had not made a good-faith effort to achieve
equality, and its justifications—maintaining communities of interest and the
difficulty of achieving legislative consensus—could not save the plan.60
In Wells, the Court invalidated New York’s congressional
apportionment plan for the same reason, while pointedly refusing to address
related partisan gerrymandering claims.61 Four Justices—Fortas, Harlan,
Stewart, and White—disagreed sharply with the majority’s insistence on
precise mathematical equality.62 Justice Fortas concurred in both cases and

56. As Samuel Issacharoff observed:
While the Supreme Court’s opinion in Reynolds left open the possibility that
alternatives to the one-person, one-vote rule might satisfy constitutional norms, the
logic of judicial review inexorably pushed the equipopulation principle to the fore.
The very qualities of objectivity and manageability that made the equipopulation
strategy appealing in Reynolds soon made it the sole arbiter of political fairness.
Issacharoff, Elusive Quest, supra note 22, at 1651.
57. 394 U.S. 526 (1969).
58. 394 U.S. 542 (1969).
59. Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 531.
60. Id. at 531–33; see also White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783 (1973) (upholding invalidation of
congressional apportionment plan for lack of good-faith effort to achieve absolute population
equality, but reversing district court rejection of plan that followed legislative districting choices as
much as possible while achieving population equality).
61. Wells, 394 U.S. at 544, 546–47.
62. See Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 538 (Fortas, J., concurring) (arguing that state legislatures
should not have to “ignore the boundaries of common sense” to achieve precise mathematical
equality of population in congressional districts); Wells, 394 U.S. at 549–50 (Harlan, J., dissenting
joined by Stewart, J.) (ridiculing the “magic formula” of “one man-one vote” as practically
unworkable and ineffective at preventing partisan gerrymandering); id. at 553–54 (White, J.,
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accused the Court of firming up the equal population requirement while
simultaneously disallowing any conceivably legitimate excuse for
deviation.63 Small population disparities should be tolerated, he argued, “in
the absence of evidence of gerrymandering—the deliberate and arbitrary
distortion of district boundaries and populations for partisan or personal
political purposes.”64
Objecting that “the Court’s exclusive concentration upon arithmetic
blinds it to the realities of the political process,” Harlan took it upon himself
to state what those realities are: “The fact of the matter is that the rule of
absolute equality is perfectly compatible with ‘gerrymandering’ of the worst
sort.”65 “If the Court believes it has struck a blow today for fully responsive
representative democracy, it is sorely mistaken,” he elaborated, echoing
Frankfurter’s Baker critique.66 “Even more than in the past, district lines are
likely to be drawn to maximize the political advantage of the party
temporarily dominant in public affairs.”67
Yet even as a majority of the Court resisted appeals to address partisan
gerrymandering, they also refused to tighten population requirements in the
state apportionment context.68 In Gaffney v. Cummings, the Court upheld
Connecticut’s legislative apportionment plan, adopted by a bipartisan
districting board that deliberately sought rough proportionality between
voters’ partisan preferences and party representation in the legislature,
despite population deviations of almost eight percent among House districts
and almost two percent among Senate districts.69 Justice White, who had
dissented from Kirkpatrick’s strict equipopulation rule, wrote for the

dissenting) (arguing that the possibility of precise mathematical equality in population among
congressional districts is “illusory” and that the Court’s insistence on precise equality will require
greater judicial involvement in congressional redistricting).
63. Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 536–37 (Fortas, J., concurring).
64. Id. at 537–38.
65. Wells, 394 U.S. at 551 (Harlan, J., dissenting from both Kirkpatrick and Wells).
66. Id. at 552 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
67. Id. Justice White sounded the same theme, contending that the marginal benefits achieved
through enforcement of the rigid population equality standard of Kirkpatrick and Wells would be
more than offset by the corresponding decrease in legislatures’ ability to minimize gerrymandering.
He noted:
Today’s decisions, on the one hand require precise adherence to admittedly inexact
census figures, and on the other downgrade a restraint on a far greater potential threat
to equality of representation, the gerrymander. Legislatures intent on minimizing the
representation of selected political or racial groups are invited to ignore political
boundaries and compact districts so long as they adhere to population equality among
districts . . . .
Id. at 555 (White, J., dissenting from both Kirkpatrick and Wells).
68. See, e.g., Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 324 (1973) (concluding that “Virginia’s
legislative redistricting plan was not to be judged by the more stringent standards” applied in
Kirkpatrick and Wells).
69. 412 U.S. 735, 737 (1973).
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majority. Noting that Reynolds gave states more flexibility in apportioning
their own legislatures than in drawing congressional district lines, Justice
White emphasized that courts should tolerate minor deviations from absolute
equality if the state had legitimate reasons for carving out districts as it did.70
Observing that “[p]olitics and political considerations are inseparable from
districting and apportionment,” the majority squarely rejected the contention
“that any political consideration taken into account in fashioning a
reapportionment plan is sufficient to invalidate it.”71 The majority held that
the state’s pursuit of “political fairness” between Democrats and Republicans
easily justified the departures from equipopulousness.72
A decade later, the Court decided Karcher v. Daggett, which concerned
a challenge to a New Jersey congressional apportionment plan that allegedly
diluted Republican voting strength in Newark.73 Justice Brennan’s opinion
for the Court analyzed the claims under Article I, § 2, Wesberry and
Kirkpatrick, and invalidated the scheme solely because population deviations
between districts did not reflect a good-faith effort to achieve population
equality.74 Four dissenters opposed the majority’s insistence on near
precision, invoking the by-now familiar objection that fastidious insistence
on population equality would serve to facilitate, rather than impede, partisan
gerrymandering.75
Justice Stevens concurred. Although agreeing that an insistence on
equipopulousness alone would facilitate gerrymandering, he thought that, in
this case, the small malapportionment was itself further evidence of partisan
gerrymandering:
The Equal Protection Clause requires every State to govern
impartially. When a State adopts rules governing its election
machinery or defining electoral boundaries, those rules must serve the
interests of the entire community. If they serve no purpose other than
to favor one segment—whether racial, ethnic, religious, economic, or

70. Id. at 741–43.
71. Id. at 752–53.
72. Id. at 753.
73. 462 U.S. 725 (1983).
74. Id. at 727. In applying the Kirkpatrick standard in Karcher, the Court nonetheless discarded
some of its more rigid characteristics. Justice Brennan’s Kirkpatrick opinion had rejected a laundry
list of justifications for population deviations among Missouri’s congressional districts. See
Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. 533–36. But in Karcher, Brennan explicitly acknowledged that
[a]ny number of consistently applied legislative policies might justify some variance,
including . . . making districts compact, respecting municipal boundaries, preserving
the cores of prior districts, and avoiding contests between incumbent Representatives.
As long as the criteria are nondiscriminatory, these are all legitimate objectives that on
a proper showing could justify minor population deviations.
Karcher, 462 U.S. at 740 (citations omitted).
75. Karcher, 462 U.S. at 775–76 (White, J., dissenting).
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political—that may occupy a position of strength at a particular point
in time, or to disadvantage a politically weak segment of the
community, they violate the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection.76
Stevens urged that equal protection’s straightforward mandate of
neutrality could be enforced relatively easily by “consider[ing] whether the
plan has a significant adverse impact on an identifiable political group,
whether the plan has objective indicia of irregularity, and then, whether the
State is able to produce convincing evidence that the plan nevertheless serves
neutral, legitimate interests of the community as a whole.”77 And such
objective indicia of irregularity, he explained, would not be hard to come by.
They include “dramatically irregular shapes,”78 “[s]ubstantial divergences
from a mathematical standard of compactness,”79 and “[e]xtensive deviation
from established political boundaries.”80 Where a plaintiff can establish a
significant adverse impact and objective indicia of irregularity and the state
cannot show “that its plan is supported by adequate neutral criteria,” Stevens
would have allowed courts to “conclude that the challenged scheme is either
totally irrational or entirely motivated by a desire to curtail the political
strength of the affected political group.”81
For the four dissenters, Karcher furnished an opportunity to criticize
Kirkpatrick’s strict equipopulation standard, its application to a plan with
population deviation of less than one percent, and its detrimental effect on
political fairness. Justice White, whose opinion was joined by three other
justices, reprised the warnings from his Kirkpatrick dissent.82 In hindsight,
he observed, one of Kirkpatrick’s most significant effects may have been to
“provid[e] a patina of respectability for the equipopulous gerrymander.”83
He argued that the Court would do better to set a maximum permissible
deviation; he suggested five percent.84 This would allow the states to give
effect to considerations like compactness and preservation of political
subdivisions in drawing congressional districts, without having to worry that
their plans would later be invalidated for failing to achieve strict equality.85

76. Id. at 748 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
77. Id. at 751 (Stevens, J., concurring).
78. Id. at 755 (Stevens, J., concurring).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 758 (Stevens, J., concurring).
81. Id. at 760–61 (Stevens, J., concurring).
82. See Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 553–56 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Kirkpatrick and Wells holdings are “unduly rigid and unwarranted applications of the Equal
Protection Clause which will unnecessarily involve the courts in the abrasive task of drawing
district lines”).
83. Karcher, 462 U.S. at 777 (White, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 781–82 (White, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 780 (White, J., dissenting).
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It would have the additional virtue of substantially harmonizing the standards
applicable to state and congressional apportionment.86
Justice Powell was the only dissenter to engage Justice Stevens on the
gerrymandering standards question in any detail. He agreed with Stevens
that gerrymandering could cause injuries of constitutional magnitude,87 and
blamed Kirkpatrick’s “uncompromising emphasis on numerical equality” for
“encourag[ing] and legitimat[ing] even the most outrageously partisan
gerrymandering.”88 According to Powell, equal protection condemned
apportionment schemes with “the purpose and effect of substantially
disenfranchising identifiable groups of voters.”89 For him, as for Stevens, the
clearest indicator of such disenfranchisement was the drawing of lines that
could not be rationally defended on the basis of any coherent state policy.90
Where state-drawn districts lack compactness, or disregard traditional
political boundaries, the state should be required to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the plan.91
Powell agreed that, on the facts of the case, “one cannot rationally
believe that the New Jersey Legislature considered factors other than the
most partisan political goals and population equality.”92 Absent some
compelling and legitimate state justifications—which Powell doubted the
state could supply—the plan almost certainly violated equal protection.
However, because the district court below had considered only the
constitutionality of the population deviations, and the gerrymandering issue
therefore was not at issue, Powell dissented only as to the majority’s
unyielding application of Kirkpatrick.93
B. Bandemer
Although the Gaffney Court had upheld the Connecticut scheme against
claims of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering, the mere fact that it
resolved the case on the merits might have suggested that such claims were
justiciable.94 And Justices Stevens and Powell made clear in their separate
Karcher opinions that they shared that view.95 However, the full Court did
not squarely address the question until three years later (thirteen after
86. Id. at 782 n.14 (White, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 787 (Powell, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 785 (Powell, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 788 (Powell, J., dissenting).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 788–89 (Powell, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 790 (Powell, J., dissenting).
94. The Bandemer Court would later make just this point. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S.
109, 119–20 (1986). But see id. at 120–21 (discussing dicta from other cases, as well as summary
dispositions, that seem to “look in different directions” on the question of justiciability).
95. Karcher, 462 U.S. at 760–61 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 787 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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Gaffney) when, in Davis v. Bandemer, it confronted a challenge by Indiana
Democrats to a redistricting scheme for the state House and Senate adopted
by the Republican-controlled legislature.
Justice O’Connor, Chief Justice Burger and then-Justice Rehnquist
would have held claims of partisan gerrymandering nonjusticiable.96
Emphasizing the quintessentially political nature of redistricting, Justice
O’Connor predicted that courts would be unable to craft a stable test that
would not evolve into “a requirement of roughly proportional representation
for every cohesive political group.”97 And such a requirement would
constitute just the sort of fundamental policy determination inappropriate for
the judiciary.98 Because claims of partisan gerrymandering would therefore
be plagued either by “a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards” or by “the impossibility of deciding [the dispute] without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion,”99 they
presented a nonjusticiable political question under Baker’s disjunctive sixpart test.100
The remaining six Justices disagreed,101 arguing instead that Baker’s
own conclusion that malapportionment claims are justiciable “applies equally
to the question” of partisan gerrymandering.102 As Justice White explained,
the easily managed “one person, one vote” rule of Wesberry and Reynolds
had not yet been developed when Baker was decided, and the Baker Court
“did not rely on the potential for such a rule in finding justiciability.”103
Accordingly, there was little reason to fear that the Court could not also find
a manageable way to adjudicate claims of partisan gerrymandering.104
96. More precisely, and marginally more narrowly, they would have held nonjusticiable those
partisan gerrymandering claims pressed by “major political parties.” Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 144
(O’Connor, J., concurring).
97. Id. at 147 (O’Connor, J., concurring). As we will see, this is a recurring claim, pressed by
scholars as well as Justices. See infra section II(B)(1).
98. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 145 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
99. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
100. See supra text accompanying note 32.
101. Justice White’s opinion concerning justiciability was joined not only by the three other
members of the plurality but also by Justices Powell and Stevens. See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 165
n.4 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
102. Id. at 123.
103. Id.
104. The majority took issue not only with Justice O’Connor’s conclusion that partisan
gerrymandering claims should be nonjusticiable, but also with the particular considerations upon
which she relied in support of that conclusion. Among other things, O’Connor had supposed that
“political gerrymandering may be a ‘self-limiting enterprise,’” id. at 126 (quoting id. at 152
(O’Connor, J., concurring)), and had worried that a holding of justiciability “will lead to ‘political
instability and judicial malaise’ because nothing will prevent members of other identifiable groups
from bringing similar claims.” Id. at 126 (quoting id. at 147 (O’Connor, J., concurring)) (citation
omitted). This “analysis is flawed,” the majority concluded
because it focuses on the perceived need for judicial review and on the potential
practical problems with allowing such review. Validation of the consideration of such
amorphous and wide-ranging factors in assessing justiciability would alter substantially
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But the majority split on the appropriate test. All six Justices who
agreed on justiciability agreed too that a successful claim of unconstitutional
partisan gerrymandering required proof of “both intentional discrimination
against an identifiable political group and an actual discriminatory effect on
that group.”105 They divided on how to measure the requisite discriminatory
effect.
Writing now for a four-member plurality, Justice White announced that
“unconstitutional discrimination occurs only when the electoral system is
arranged in a manner that will consistently degrade a voter’s or a group of
voters’ influence on the political process as a whole.”106 And then, either
further elucidating this standard of consistent degradation or amending it, the
plurality explained that “a finding of unconstitutionality must be supported
by evidence of continued frustration of the will of a majority of the voters or
effective denial to a minority of voters of a fair chance to influence the
political process.”107
Justice Powell, joined by Justice Stevens, rejected the plurality’s
approach. Although Powell criticized several aspects of the plurality’s
opinion, at its core his opinion reprised the view that Justice Stevens had
developed in his Karcher concurrence and with which Powell himself had
then expressed sympathy in dissent. To begin, Powell interpreted the
Constitution to impose far more stringent limitations on partisan
gerrymandering.108 Whereas the plurality, like Justice O’Connor, viewed the
pursuit of partisan advantage as an inevitable and seemingly acceptable part
of redistricting,109 Powell insisted, as Stevens had earlier, that “district lines
the analysis the Court enunciated in Baker v. Carr, and we decline Justice O’Connor’s
implicit invitation to rethink that approach.
Id. at 126–27.
105. Id. at 127; id. at 161 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
106. Id. at 132.
107. Id. at 133. In language that would later be picked up by lower courts, see, e.g., Badham v.
Eu, 694 F. Supp. 664, 670 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (three-judge court), summarily aff’d, 488 U.S. 1024
(1989), the plurality proceeded to intimate that plaintiffs might be required to show that they “had
essentially been shut out of the political process.” Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 139.
108. Id. at 166 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
109. See, e.g., id. at 128. John Hart Ely contended that Justice O’Connor’s concurrence did not
express any opinion about partisan gerrymandering but merely designated the issue nonjusticiable.
John Hart Ely, Gerrymanders: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 50 STAN. L. REV. 607, 621 n.75
(1998). It is true, of course, that holding a claim nonjusticiable need not entail any judgment
regarding the constitutionality or propriety of the practice challenged. Nonetheless, the overall
tenor of O’Connor’s opinion strongly suggests a belief that at least moderate forms of partisan
gerrymandering are constitutionally inoffensive, and perhaps desirable. See, e.g., Bandemer, 478
U.S. at 145 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The opportunity to control the drawing of electoral
boundaries through the legislative process of apportionment is a critical and traditional part of
politics in the United States, and one that plays no small role in fostering active participation in the
political parties at every level.”). Relying on this passage, Pamela Karlan seems justified in reading
O’Connor’s concurrence as an “endorsement of partisan gerrymandering.” See Pamela S. Karlan,
All Over the Map: The Supreme Court’s Voting Rights Trilogy, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 284 &
n.176.
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should be determined in accordance with neutral and legitimate criteria.
When deciding where those lines will fall, the State should treat its voters as
standing in the same position, regardless of their political beliefs or party
affiliation.”110
More pointedly, Powell charged that, with its emphasis on consistent
degradation and frustration of voters’ will, the plurality “fail[ed] to enunciate
any standard that affords guidance to legislatures and courts.”111 Instead,
again echoing Stevens, Powell urged that courts should be able to identify
when legislatures have resorted (unconstitutionally) to partisan
considerations by looking to three factors: “the shapes of voting districts and
adherence to established political subdivision boundaries”; legislative
procedures and legislative history that bear upon partisan motivation; and
evidence concerning distribution of voters by party affiliation and statistics
tending to show dilution of minority party influence relative to political
support.112
In light of the disagreements between Justices White and Powell, the
opacity of the plurality opinion itself, and the fact, surprising to many, that
the Court could hold gerrymandering claims justiciable yet uphold the
instance actually before it, contemporary observers found it hard to say just
what Bandemer required.113 But whatever its precise requirements, many
anticipated that the test was unmeetable.114
C. Vieth
The assumption that Bandemer was toothless was confirmed in the
years that followed. Of the twenty suits challenging the drawing of district
lines under Bandemer, courts denied relief in every one.115 A dozen years
110.
111.
112.
113.

Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 166 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 171 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 173 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See, e.g., Bernard Grofman, Unresolved Issues in Partisan Gerrymandering Litigation, in
POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS, supra note 13, at 3, 3 (claiming that Bandemer
“has given rise to considerable scholarly dispute over what the test of unconstitutional political
gerrymandering will ultimately prove to be”); see also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769, 1774
(2004) (plurality opinion) (citing various commentators and courts).
114. See, e.g., Charles Backstrom et al., Establishing a Statewide Electoral Effects Baseline, in
POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS, supra note 13, at 145, 150 (contending that the
plurality’s standards, “if literally applied, would be impossible to meet”).
115. Cases are collected in Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1778 n.6 (plurality opinion). One much-noted
case in which Bandemer appeared to have teeth involved a challenge to North Carolina’s system of
electing superior court judges statewide instead of by districts. See Republican Party of N.C. v.
Martin, 980 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1992) (finding that the Republican Party had stated a cause of action
under Bandemer); Republican Party of N.C. v. N.C. State Bd. of Elections, 27 F.3d 563 (4th Cir.
1994) (upholding preliminary injunction ordering computation of votes on single-district as well as
state-wide bases). But even this lone success for plaintiffs was short-lived: after all eight
Republicans running for superior court judgeships were elected under the statewide scheme, the
court of appeals vacated the injunction and remanded for reconsideration. Republican Party of N.C.
v. Hunt, 77 F.3d 470 (4th Cir. 1996).
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after Bandemer, John Hart Ely expressed the judgment of many when
observing that, “by its impossibly high proof requirements the Court in
Bandemer essentially eliminated political gerrymandering as a meaningful
cause of action.”116
The Vieth litigation exemplifies the point. As a result of the 2000
census, Pennsylvania lost two congressional seats to reapportionment,
forcing the state to redistrict. This the Republican-controlled General
Assembly did with gusto, enacting a new districting scheme designed to hand
the Republicans between 12 and 14 of the state’s 19 congressional seats,
even though the Republican and Democratic Parties enjoy nearly equal
support among the Pennsylvania electorate.117 The legislature accomplished
this end by “sacrific[ing] every traditional districting principle—slashing
through municipalities and neighborhoods, splitting counties, . . . producing
oddly misshapen districts,” and pairing “six incumbents, five of whom are
Democrats.”118 Nonetheless, a three-judge district court largely dismissed a
challenge subsequently brought by Democratic voters.119 The General
Assembly’s intent to discriminate against Democratic voters was patent. But
because the redistricting scheme gave the Democrats five safe seats, and
because plaintiffs could engage in such activities as organizing, campaigning,
and voting, the court reasoned, plaintiffs could not possibly establish that
they “will be completely shut out of the political process.”120 This was, it
seems, a fair application of Bandemer. So when the Supreme Court noted
jurisdiction, several election law experts understandably predicted that the
Court was poised to put teeth into Bandemer.121
Sure enough, all nine Justices agreed that the Bandemer test was
unsatisfactory.122 But they fractured over what to do about it. Writing in

116. Ely, supra note 109, at 621; see also Issacharoff, Elusive Quest, supra note 22, at 1646
(noting that Bandemer’s “standards are fundamentally unworkable and incorporate such ambiguous
and unclear commands as to be unfit for any manageable form of judicial application”).
117. Vieth v. Pennsylvania, 188 F. Supp. 2d 532, 536 (M.D. Pa. 2002).
118. In any event, these are the plaintiffs’ allegations. Brief for Appellants at 12–13, Vieth v.
Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769 (2004) (No. 02-1580). They are broadly consistent with findings made by
the state trial judge, who nonetheless upheld the map. See Erfer v. Commonwealth, 794 A.2d 325,
350–52 (Pa. 2002) (App. A) (finding that the 2000 map split more communities and produced less
compact and more irregular districts than previous maps); see also id. at 343 (Zappala, C.J.,
dissenting) (“If the record of this case does not establish unconstitutional political gerrymandering,
no such claim exists.”). The federal courts made no findings of fact, dismissing the challenge on a
motion to dismiss. Vieth, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 538 (accepting all facts alleged by plaintiff as true for
the purposes of the motion to dismiss).
119. See Vieth, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 549 (dismissing equal protection, § 1983, free association,
and privileges and immunities claims while allowing a one-person, one-vote challenge to proceed).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court likewise rejected a challenge brought by another group of voters
alleging violations of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Erfer, 794 A.2d at 334–35.
120. Vieth, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 544.
121. See, e.g., Jeffrey Toobin, The Great Election Grab, NEW YORKER (Dec. 8, 2003) (quoting
Heather Gerken describing Vieth as a likely “effort to pull in the reins of partisan gerrymandering”).
122. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769 (2004).
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three separate dissents, four Justices—Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer—proposed new standards to replace the test put forth by the
Bandemer plurality.123 Another four—Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia, O’Connor, and Thomas—would have overruled Bandemer in toto,
holding that claims of partisan gerrymandering raise nonjusticiable political
questions. Justice Kennedy was in the middle. Agreeing with the plurality
that none of the tests on the table was adequate, he voted to affirm the threejudge court’s dismissal of the challenge. But he would not join the plurality
in holding all such claims nonjusticiable. At least not yet.
1. The Dissents.—Presenting themselves as united on what they took to
be the central question raised by Vieth—“whether political gerrymandering
claims are justiciable”124—the four dissenters nonetheless proposed three
different tests to replace the ineffectual Bandemer test.125
Not surprisingly, Justice Stevens pressed essentially the same argument
that he had first put forth in Karcher and that Justice Powell (and he) later
adopted in Bandemer. That argument contained essentially two components:
that political affiliation is simply not an appropriate basis on which to configure district lines;126 and that, by attending to the appearance of the districts
themselves (considering such criteria as bizarreness, lack of compactness,
and disregard of political subdivisions) and to the procedures under which
the district lines were adopted, courts can adequately recognize a prima facie
case of an unconstitutional gerrymander.127 Furthermore, according to
Stevens, these twin premises had already been endorsed in the Shaw line of
cases for racial gerrymandering.128 Because he had long viewed racial
gerrymandering as just a special case of partisan gerrymandering,129 it
followed that courts should
apply the standard set forth in the Shaw cases and ask whether the
legislature allowed partisan considerations to dominate and control the

123. See id. at 1799–1829. Each of the four would have remanded for retrial in accordance
with their preferred standards. Id. at 1813 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 1822 (Souter, J.,
dissenting joined by Ginsburg, J.); id. at 1829 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 1799 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
125. In so doing, the dissenters took pains to downplay their differences. See id. at 1813
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (deeming it “obviou[s]” that “several standards for identifying
impermissible partisan influence are available to judges who have the will to enforce them” and
observing that the Court “could endorse either of the approaches advocated today by Justice Souter
and Justice Breyer”); id. at 1829 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (intimating that the dissenters would reach
agreement on a test if they were able to secure Kennedy’s vote and thus become a majority); id. at
1816 n.1 (Souter, J., dissenting joined by Ginsburg, J.) (agreeing with Breyer on this point).
126. Id. at 1801 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 1801–02 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 1802 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 646–47 (1993)
(Shaw I); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 913 (1995); Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 241
(2001); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 905 (1996) (Shaw II)).
129. Id. at 1801 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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lines drawn, forsaking all neutral principles. Under my analysis, if no
neutral criterion can be identified to justify the lines drawn, and if the
only possible explanation for a district’s bizarre shape is a naked
desire to increase partisan strength, then no rational basis exists to
save the district from an equal protection challenge.130
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, started by eschewing any
search for an exact “verbal test for too much partisanship”131 and by
embracing instead a more common-law approach that would be avowedly
experimental and revisable.132 As he saw it, “[T]he Court’s job must be to
identify clues, as objective as we can make them, indicating that partisan
competition has reached an extremity of unfairness.”133 Preferring to “start
anew” and analogizing to the Court’s Title VII jurisprudence, Souter
proposed a test for partisan gerrymandering that required a “plaintiff to
satisfy elements of a prima facie cause of action, at which point the State
would have the opportunity not only to rebut the evidence supporting the
plaintiff’s case, but to offer an affirmative justification for the districting
choices, even assuming the proof of the plaintiff’s allegations.”134
The prima facie case Souter advocated would have five required
elements:135 (1) that the plaintiff belonged to a “cohesive political group”
such as a major party; (2) that the district in which the plaintiff lived “paid
little or no heed to those traditional districting principles whose disregard can
be shown straightforwardly: contiguity, compactness, respect for political
subdivisions, and conformity with geographic features like rivers and
mountains;” (3) “specific correlations between the district’s deviations from
traditional districting principles and the distribution of the population of [the
plaintiff’s] group” sufficient to support “an inference that the district took the
shape it did because of the distribution of the plaintiff’s group;” (4) a
hypothetical district that included the plaintiff’s residence “in which the
proportion of the plaintiff’s group was lower (in a packing claim) or higher
(in a cracking one) and which at the same time deviated less from traditional
districting principles than the actual district;”136 and (5) evidence “that the
130. Id. at 1812 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). Notice that his proposed test would
underenforce what he had earlier identified as the constitutional violation. It appears that, for
Stevens, the Constitution is violated when partisan motivation supplied a but-for cause for the
placement of any district lines, regardless of whether some alternative explanation is “possible.”
Indeed, Stevens acknowledged that his proposed rule would leave the Constitution underenforced:
“Such a narrow test would cover only a few meritorious claims, but it would preclude extreme
abuses . . . .” Id. See infra text accompanying note 263.
131. Id. at 1815 (Souter, J., dissenting).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1816 (Souter, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 1817 (Souter, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 1818–19 (Souter, J., dissenting).
136. “Packing” and “cracking” are the two primary tools of the gerrymanderer. Oppositionparty voters are “packed” insofar as district lines are drawn so as to concentrate them in a relatively
small number of districts in which they constitute supermajorities. They are “cracked” when
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defendants acted intentionally to manipulate the shape of the district in order
to pack or crack” the plaintiff’s group.137
Justice Breyer began by addressing an issue that had divided even the
Bandemer majority that first held partisan gerrymandering claims justiciable.
Allying himself with Justice White’s plurality against Justices Powell and
Stevens, Breyer declared flatly that “[t]he use of purely political
considerations in drawing district boundaries is not a ‘necessary evil’ that,
for lack of judicially manageable standards, the Constitution inevitably must
tolerate.”138 The value of partisanship in districting, according to Breyer,
largely derives from the value of single-member districts themselves.139
Compared to proportional representation regimes, single-member district
systems “diminish the need for coalition governments” thereby “mak[ing] it
easier for voters to identify which party is responsible for government
decisionmaking.”140 But single-member districts can be volatile. If the
districts are drawn randomly, without attention to partisan composition, then
“a small shift in political sentiment” could translate “into a seismic shift in
the makeup of the legislative delegation.”141 Therefore, he concluded “that
traditional or historically-based boundaries are not, and should not be,
‘politics free.’ Rather, those boundaries represent a series of compromises of
principle—among the virtues of, for example, close representation of voter
views, ease of identifying ‘government’ and ‘opposition’ parties, and
stability in government.”142
But, Breyer cautioned, even though “[t]he use of purely political
boundary-drawing factors”143 will often be justified by constitutional values,
sometimes they won’t be. And one circumstance in which partisan
redistricting is unconstitutional, Breyer argued, involves what he termed
“unjustified entrenchment”—the effort by “a party that enjoys only minority
support among the populace . . . to take, and hold, legislative power . . . [as]
the result of partisan manipulation and not other factors.”144 Expressly
leaving open “whether political gerrymandering does, or does not, violate the
splintered into a relatively large number of districts in which they constitute minorities. Each
method prevents opposition parties from achieving the efficiency that comes with holding a
relatively small majority in a district.
137. In a claim charging gerrymandering against a major party, Souter seemed to suggest that
proof that the other major party controlled the state government, either by controlling the entire state
legislature and the governorship or by having a veto-proof majority in the legislature, would be both
necessary and sufficient on this fifth prong. Id. at 1819 (Souter, J., dissenting). In a claim charging
discrimination against any group other than a major party, Souter noted only that “proof of intent
could, admittedly, be difficult.” Id.
138. Id. at 1822 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 1823 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1824 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1825 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
144. Id.
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Constitution in other instances”—as, presumably, when a party with bare
majority support gerrymanders to give itself a substantial supermajority of
legislators—Breyer would hold unjustified entrenchment unconstitutional.145
Recognizing that the problem of identifying unjustified entrenchment is
not “easily solved, even in extreme instances,” Breyer nonetheless expressed
confidence that “courts can identify a number of strong indicia of abuse.”146
Very generally, these indicia fall into two categories: evidence that a party
with majority support across the state has consistently failed to achieve a
majority of the seats in the relevant elections, and evidence that the
legislature has substantially departed from redistricting norms. Without
proposing any specific judicial test that might dictate a conclusion of
unconstitutional gerrymandering in a given case, Breyer observed that the
stronger the evidence of one type, the less the courts need demand of the
other.147
2. The Plurality.—A plurality consisting of Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas had no difficulty concluding that the
test advanced by the Bandemer plurality did not satisfy Baker’s call for a
judicially manageable standard—just as O’Connor, joined by Rehnquist, had
predicted in her Bandemer concurrence. Describing that standard as
“misguided when proposed” and unimproved “in subsequent application”148
and observing that it had produced “one long record of puzzlement and
consternation”149 in the lower courts, the plurality, through Justice Scalia,
rejected it “as a constitutional requirement.”150
And in the plurality’s view, the “totality-of-the-circumstances analysis”
offered in Justice Powell’s Bandemer dissent fared no better. Under this
approach, the plurality said, “all conceivable factors, none of which is
dispositive, are weighed with an eye to ascertaining whether the particular
gerrymander has gone too far—or, in Justice Powell’s terminology, whether
it is not ‘fair.’”151 But “fairness,” Scalia concluded,
does not seem to us a judicially manageable standard. . . . Some
criterion more solid and more demonstrably met than that seems to us
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1827 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 1828–29 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 1777 (plurality opinion).
149. Id. at 1779 (plurality opinion).
150. Id. at 1770 (plurality opinion). In light of criticisms I have elsewhere leveled against the
Court’s conditional spending doctrine, see Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines:
Unconstitutional Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1, 30–42 (2001); Lynn A. Baker &
Mitchell N. Berman, Getting Off the Dole: Why the Court Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine,
and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It to Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459 (2003), I cannot help
observing that “one long record of puzzlement and consternation” fairly describes the lower federal
courts’ experience with South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987), as well. See id. at 464–69.
151. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1784 (plurality opinion).
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necessary to enable the state legislatures to discern the limits of their
districting discretion, to meaningfully constrain the discretion of the
courts, and to win public acceptance for the courts’ intrusion into a
process that is the very foundation of democratic decisionmaking.152
Having made short work of Bandemer, the plurality marched through,
and rejected, all the other standards for adjudicating claims of partisan
gerrymandering that remained on the table—one proposed by the Vieth
plaintiffs and the three developed in the Vieth dissents.153
Plaintiff-appellants had proposed a test that retained the intent-pluseffect approach of the Bandemer plurality but endeavored to cure the
particular defects of that earlier effort. The proposed intent prong would be
more demanding than the intent prong from Bandemer by requiring plaintiffs
to “show that the mapmakers acted with a predominant intent to achieve
partisan advantage” in the sense that “other neutral and legitimate
redistricting criteria were subordinated to the goal of achieving partisan
advantage.”154 The effects prong of the proposed test would rectify the
vagueness of the Bandemer test by requiring plaintiffs to show both that the
challenged scheme “systematically ‘pack[s]’ and ‘crack[s]’ the rival party’s
voters” and that “the map can thwart the plaintiffs’ ability to translate a
majority of votes into a majority of seats.”155 By the plurality’s lights, this
proposal was triply infirm: the intent prong was not judicially manageable,
and the effects prong was neither manageable nor discernible.
In criticizing the plaintiffs’ intent standard, the plurality took aim at a
central assumption underlying it: that because the Court’s racial
gerrymandering jurisprudence prohibited a predominant intent to
discriminate on the basis of race, that same predominant intent test must also
be manageable in the partisan gerrymandering context. That, the plurality
concluded, was just wrong. For one thing, “in the racial gerrymandering

152. Id.
153. The plurality prefaced its assessment of the standards proposed in the three dissents “with
the observation that the mere fact that these four dissenters come up with three different standards—
all of them different from the two proposed in Bandemer and the one proposed here by appellants—
goes a long way to establishing that there is no constitutionally discernible standard.” Id. I will
argue that a proper understanding of the conceptual structure of constitutional doctrine suggests that
this is very much mistaken. The four dissenters, the lone concurrence, six Justices in Bandemer,
and the appellants—indeed, even the plurality itself—actually discerned much the same
“constitutional standard.” The constitutionally discernible standard on which they all centered was
a prohibition against the pursuit of excessive partisan advantage in redistricting. The Vieth
dissenters differed among themselves, and with the Bandemer plurality and dissent, principally
concerning what test courts should create in order to administer that constitutionally discernible
standard. And even here the Vieth dissenters were disagreeing over what judicial test would be
optimal, not over what would be adequate. See supra note 125.
154. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1780 (quoting Brief for Appellants, supra note 118, at 19 (emphasis in
Vieth)) (plurality opinion).
155. Id. at 1784 (quoting Brief for Appellants, supra note 118, at 20) (plurality opinion).
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context, the predominant intent test has been applied to the challenged
district in which the plaintiffs voted.”156 But the Vieth plaintiffs proposed
their test as a way to challenge a statewide redistricting plan, not the
placement of lines within a particular district.157 According to the plurality,
this was a defect, not a virtue.
Vague as the “predominant motivation” test might be when used to
evaluate single districts, it all but evaporates when applied statewide.
Does it mean, for instance, that partisan intent must outweigh all other
goals—contiguity, compactness, preservation of neighborhoods,
etc.—statewide? And how is the statewide “outweighing” to be
determined?158
Moreover, “Even within the narrower compass of challenges to a single
district, applying a ‘predominant intent’ test to racial gerrymandering is
easier and less disruptive.”159 This is because “the purpose of segregating
voters on the basis of race” is rare and unlawful, whereas the purpose of
segregating them for partisan advantage is common and—when not pursued
in “excess”—lawful.160 Given this difference, “to the extent that our racial
gerrymandering cases represent a model of discernible and manageable
standards, they provide no comfort here.”161

156. Id. at 1780 (plurality opinion).
157. Id. at 1773 (plurality opinion).
158. Id. at 1781 (plurality opinion).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. Although I have tried to present the plurality’s argument concerning the infirmities of
plaintiffs’ intent prong, it must be said that this part of the plurality’s analysis is unusually
muddled—extraordinarily so for a Scalia opinion. What is clear is that, according to the plurality,
the intentions to segregate voters on the bases of race and of partisan affiliation differ in the two
ways I have described—that the former is rare and unlawful, whereas the latter (if not taken to an
extreme) is common and lawful. Now, this claim is at least doubly contestable—on the empirical
claim that an intention to segregate voters on the basis of race is rare and on the interpretive claim
that the intent to pursue only moderate partisan advantage is constitutionally permissible. Those
quibbles aside, what is really unclear is how this observation is supposed to bear upon whether the
proposed intent prong is judicially manageable. Here is the plurality’s reasoning on this score in its
entirety:
[1] Determining whether the shape of a particular district is so substantially affected by
the presence of a rare and constitutionally suspect motive as to invalidate it is quite
different from determining whether it is so substantially affected by the excess of an
ordinary and lawful motive as to invalidate it. [2] Moreover, the fact that partisan
districting is a lawful and common practice means that there is almost always room for
an election-impeding lawsuit contending that partisan advantage was the predominant
motivation; not so for claims of racial gerrymandering. [3] Finally, courts might be
justified in accepting a modest degree of unmanageability to enforce a constitutional
command which (like the Fourteenth Amendment obligation to refrain from racial
discrimination) is clear; whereas they are not justified in inferring a judicially
enforceable constitutional obligation (the obligation not to apply too much partisanship
in districting) which is both dubious and severely unmanageable. [4] For these reasons,
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In the plurality’s eyes, the plaintiffs’ effects prong fares no better. It is
not “judicially discernible in the sense of being relevant to some
constitutional violation” because it “rests upon the principle that groups (or at
least political-action groups) have a right to proportional representation.”162
And it’s not judicially manageable because it is “impossible to assess the
effects of partisan gerrymandering,”163 difficult to establish whether a party
has “majority status,”164 and “impossible to assure” that a party that does
enjoy majority status “wins a majority of seats.”165
to the extent that our racial gerrymandering cases represent a model of discernible and
manageable standards, they provide no comfort here.
Id. (bracketed numbers added). Sentence [4] claims that the plurality has provided several reasons
in support of its claim that differences between race and partisanship argue against adopting a
predominant intent test in the latter context. But has it? And, if so, are those reasons persuasive?
Clearly, the plurality does supply a reason in sentence [2]: Because a purpose to secure partisan
advantage is more common than is a purpose to segregate voters on account of race, a judicial test
that looks to the former is likely to produce more litigation and to prove more disruptive. Yet this
reason is doubly questionable. First, the history of post-Shaw litigation suggests that plaintiffs can
very often muster a racial gerrymandering claim. Second, even to the extent that the factual
predicate holds true, it’s very far from clear that this is the sort of consideration that properly bears
upon the manageability question. See infra note 198 and accompanying text. So I think that the
reason contained in sentence [2] is not very persuasive. But, to reiterate, a reason it is. Are there
others?
Surely the introductory word of sentence [2] implies that a reason has appeared in sentence [1]
too. But it has not. Sentence [1] is actually devoid of reason; it is just a restatement of the claimed
distinctions conjoined to the assertion that they make the inquiries “quite different.” Sentence [3]
also contains a reason. But it is the wrong sort of reason. That the obligation to refrain from racial
discrimination is clearer than is the obligation not to apply too much partisanship in districting
might be a reason to tolerate more unmanageability when adjudicating the former than the latter.
But the unmanageability of the proposed “predominant intent to achieve partisan advantage”
standard is precisely what sentence [3] is advertised as helping to demonstrate. Justice Stevens is
therefore right to label this reasoning “tautological.” Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1804 n.13 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Beyond its circularity, it is puzzling. The claim that “the obligation not to apply too
much partisanship in districting” is “dubious” sits uncomfortably with the plurality’s repeated
recognition that the Constitution does indeed impose just such an obligation. See infra note 192.
162. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1782 (plurality opinion).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1783 (plurality opinion). Unfortunately, here too the plurality’s analysis leaves
much to be desired. To start, pieces of the plurality’s critique fail to persuade even on their own
terms. Recall that the effects prong of the plaintiffs’ test would require a showing that the
challenged scheme systematically packs and cracks a plaintiff’s party and that, as a result, the
scheme prevents that party from winning a majority of seats even if it wins a majority of the votes
statewide. Id. at 1780–81 (plurality opinion). In response, the plurality suggests that courts are
unable to determine whether there is systematic packing and cracking because “a person’s politics is
rarely . . . readily discernible” and “not an immutable characteristic.” Id. at 1782 (plurality
opinion). Of course a person’s politics is not immutable. But the argument as a whole—that
packing and cracking cannot be discerned—can hardly be taken seriously. As Justice Souter
objected, the noncontroversial fact that partisan gerrymandering is widespread indicates that
legislators have significant faith in their ability to discern a person’s politics. See id. at 1817 n.2
(Souter, J., dissenting). Furthermore, as Rick Pildes has smartly observed, the posture of naivete
that Scalia assumes here contrasts markedly with his more realistic recognition, in McConnell v.
FEC, 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003), that “the effects of political practices should be gauged against the
assumption that political behavior is rationally self-interested.” Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme
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Scalia applies similar criticisms to the three different approaches that
were floated by the dissenters. Justice Stevens’s test failed essentially
because he, like the plaintiffs, erroneously assumed that because a judicial
inquiry into predominant intent is manageable in racial gerrymandering
cases, a similar inquiry is therefore manageable in partisan gerrymandering
cases.166 Justice Souter’s five-part test is criticized on the ground “that each
of the last four steps requires a quantifying judgment that is unguided and ill
suited to the development of judicial standards.”167 More fundamentally,
Souter’s proposal “is doomed to failure” because “[n]o test—yea, not even a
five-part test—can possibly be successful unless one knows what he is
testing.”168 And yet Souter does not make clear “the precise constitutional
deprivation his test is designed to identify and prevent,”169 offering only the
“flabby goal” of preventing “an extremity of unfairness.”170 Thus, even if

Court, 2003 Term—Foreword: The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 29, 65 (2004) [hereinafter Pildes, Democratic Politics].
More fundamentally, though, the plurality’s objections rest on a misapprehension of the
plaintiffs’ proposal. The plaintiffs’ core claim, as I read it, is that “[a]ny party that earns a majority
of the vote should have at least a fighting chance to become the governing party, with a majority of
seats.” Reply Brief for Appellants at 5, Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769 (2004) (No. 02-1580)
(emphasis added); see also Brief for Appellants, supra note 118, at 25. To operationalize this idea,
plaintiffs then proposed a complex and sophisticated methodology consisting of several discrete
steps: (1) identifying all the statewide races contested by the major parties over the past decade
(e.g., races for president, senators, governor, secretary of state, comptroller general, and the like);
(2) determining for each race the percentage of votes won by each party’s candidate, and thus the
percentage increase (decrease) in votes that each losing (winning) candidate of the out party would
have needed in order to have won a bare majority of votes; (3) normalizing each election to simulate
an outcome in which the out-party candidate would have won a bare majority of votes, by applying
that percentage increase (or decrease) to his vote total in each district that comprises the challenged
scheme; and (4) counting the number of districts in which the candidate for the out party would
have won a majority of votes in that simulated election. The Vieth plaintiffs then claimed that if
performing this methodology for every statewide election would yield only a trivially small number
of elections for which it would be true that the out-party candidate with a bare (50.1%) majority of
the vote would have won a majority of the votes in at least half of the districts, then it is fair to
conclude that the in party would have “lock[ed] up a majority of seats even if the other party
overtakes it in popular support . . . .” Id. at 35 (emphasis added).
Certainly, parts of the plaintiffs’ test can be reasonably challenged. For example, one might
deny the initial majoritarian premise. Or, one might question the normalizing assumption by which
the same percentage increase in votes is allocated to each district. But my goal here is not to assess
the overall wisdom or feasibility of the plaintiffs’ proposal. Worth noting for present purposes is
only that the particular objections leveled by the plurality are misconceived. The plaintiffs’
approach never requires a court to determine whether any given party does in fact have “majority
status” in the state; does not argue that if a party were to possess majority status, it must be
guaranteed a majority of seats; and, by endorsing the so-called “seats bonus” (often called the
winner’s bonus), expressly disavows the principle that any groups have a right to proportional
representation. See Reply Brief for Appellants, supra, at 7–8; Brief for Appellants, supra note 118,
at 34.
166. See Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1785 (plurality opinion).
167. Id. at 1787 (plurality opinion).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1788 (plurality opinion).
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Souter’s five steps “could be manageably applied,” the plurality saw “no
reason to think they would detect the constitutional crime.”171 Justice
Breyer’s dissent receives some approval from the plurality, which is not
surprising given that Breyer, alone among the dissenters, takes pains to insist
that some pursuit of partisan advantage is constitutional. Also not surprising,
though, is the plurality’s conclusion that Breyer’s analysis provides little
guidance for courts in determining when “unjustified entrenchment” has
occurred.172
On the basis of this extended analysis, the plurality concluded that “no
judicially discernible and manageable standards for adjudicating political
gerrymandering claims have emerged.”173 As a result, “we must conclude
that political gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable and that Bandemer
was wrongly decided.”174
3. The Concurrence.—In effect, Justice Kennedy agreed with this first
statement—that no judicially manageable standards have yet emerged—but
disagreed with the second—that the failure of an acceptable standard to
appear thus far justified a conclusion that none could emerge within an
acceptable timeframe.
According to Kennedy, courts confront “two obstacles” when seeking to
adjudicate claims of partisan gerrymandering.175 “First is the lack of
comprehensive and neutral principles for drawing electoral boundaries.”176
Not only is there no present agreement on a “substantive definition of
fairness in districting,”177 there is also a lack of “helpful discussions on the
principles of fair districting discussed in the annals of parliamentary or
legislative bodies.”178 The second obstacle, related to the first, “is the
absence of rules to limit and confine judicial intervention.”179 Given the
absence, thus far, of “agreed upon substantive principles of fairness in
districting,” the courts are left with “no basis on which to define clear,
manageable, and politically neutral standards for measuring the particular
burden a given partisan classification imposes on representational rights.”180
Agreeing with the plurality that no tests yet proposed have overcome
these obstacles, Kennedy would have dismissed the challenge for failure to

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at 1786 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 1788 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 1778 (plurality opinion).
Id.
Id. at 1793 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1794 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 1793 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id.
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state a claim.181 And he acknowledged that the more extreme conclusion—
that claims of partisan gerrymandering should be held nonjusticiable—“may
prevail in the long run.”182 But, unlike the plurality, he was not prepared to
reach that conclusion just yet.
For one thing, pessimism that a manageable standard might emerge was
premature. The fact, heavily relied upon by the plurality, that no adequate
standard has emerged since Bandemer, means little because “during these
past 18 years the lower courts could do no more than follow” Bandemer.183
Besides, “by the timeline of the law 18 years is rather a short period.”184 All
the more so because claims of partisan gerrymandering had generally relied
most heavily on the Equal Protection Clause. But, Kennedy observed, the
First Amendment might prove to be the “more relevant constitutional
provision.”185
Yet more fundamentally, Kennedy showed himself to be more sensitive
to the grotesque affront to democratic principles that extreme partisan
gerrymandering represents, and less sanguine that the practice could be
meaningfully limited without judicial intervention. Ironically, just as the
181. Id. at 1796–97 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Although no doubt happy to receive Kennedy’s
vote, the plurality nonetheless objected that dismissal was not a disposition available to him: “It is
logically impossible to affirm [the district court’s] dismissal without either (1) finding that the
unconstitutional-districting standard applied by the District Court, or some other standard that it
should have applied, has not been met, or (2) finding (as we have) that the claim is nonjusticiable.”
Id. at 1790 (plurality opinion).
I believe that the plurality is correct that Kennedy ought not to have dismissed the complaint for
failure to state a claim. True, given Kennedy’s flirtation with the First Amendment as a possible
basis for adjudicating partisan gerrymandering claims, see infra note 185 and accompanying text, I
suppose he could have rejoined that he aims to leave open hope only under that constitutional
provision and agrees with the plurality that the Equal Protection Clause does not provide the basis
for justiciable claims of partisan gerrymandering. Cf. Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan,
Where to Draw the Line? Judicial Review of Political Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 543
(2004) (arguing that “no matter how difficult judicial review of political gerrymandering claims
may be . . . the overall doctrinal structure governing redistricting makes it impossible actually to
render such claims nonjusticiable”). Had the plaintiffs not pleaded the First Amendment,
affirmance of the district court’s dismissal would have been appropriate. I am not myself
sympathetic to this provision-by-provision approach to justiciability. In any event, the plaintiffs did
plead the First Amendment, and Kennedy did not take this route, so the gist of his response to the
plurality on this score, see Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1797 (Kennedy, J., concurring), is not entirely clear.
Kennedy’s better response might have been to challenge the plurality’s insistence that he was
duty-bound to supply a standard. At the heart of Kennedy’s opinion is the judgment that it is the
plaintiffs’ burden to persuade the court that the Constitution has been violated, and that they have
not done this. On this (admittedly ad hoc) approach, decision for the state defendant would have
been proper, but it would have been a decision on the merits, not a dismissal for failure to state a
claim.
182. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1794 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
183. Id. at 1796 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1797 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“After all, these allegations involve the First
Amendment interest of not burdening or penalizing citizens because of their participation in the
electoral process, their voting history, their association with a political party, or their expression of
political views.”).
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plurality had criticized Breyer’s opinion for failing to undertake any costbenefit analysis concerning whether judicial intervention is justified,186
Kennedy’s disagreement with the plurality can be seen as a charge that the
plurality also failed to take the relevant costs into account. But whereas the
plurality thought Breyer ignored the costs of judicial intervention, Kennedy
charged the plurality with understating the costs of judicial abdication.
“The ordered working of our Republic, and of the democratic process,
depends on a sense of decorum and restraint in all branches of government,
and in the citizenry itself,” he wrote.187 And the Pennsylvania legislature’s
abandonment of that restraint, he continued, “should not be thought to serve
the interests of our political order. Nor should it be thought to serve our
interest in demonstrating to the world how democracy works.”188 Although
he, like the plurality, voted to uphold the Pennsylvania partisan gerrymander
for want of a manageable standard, Kennedy explicitly left open hope for the
future. “If workable standards do emerge,” he insisted, “courts should be
prepared to order relief.”189
II.

Two Problems of Manageability

Although Vieth could be read to introduce ever more confusion to
partisan gerrymandering jurisprudence,190 in one key respect it brought more
light. For the first time,191 all the Justices agreed that the pursuit of partisan
186. Justice Breyer had recognized that several avenues of redress may be available for a
majority to prevent minority entrenchment—the governor, redistricting commissions, Congress, and
the people via ballot initiatives and referenda. Id. at 1826 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Because of this,
the plurality pointed out, the cost of judicial inaction might not be great. Accordingly, it argued,
Breyer should have attended to the costs of action. And these, the plurality contended were
substantial, for “court action that is available tends to be sought, not just where it is necessary, but
where it is in the interest of the seeking party. And the vaguer the test for availability, the more
frequently interest rather than necessity will produce litigation.” Id. at 1789 (plurality opinion).
The plurality concluded that “the regular insertion of the judiciary into districting, with the delay
and uncertainty that brings to the political process and the partisan enmity it brings upon the courts”
was not “worth the benefit to be achieved—an accelerated (by some unknown degree) effectuation
of the majority will.” Id. at 1789 (plurality opinion).
187. Id. at 1798 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1799 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
190. Cf. J. Clark Kelso, United States Supreme Court Case Preview: Vieth v. Jubelirer:
Judicial Review of Political Gerrymanders, 3 ELECTION L.J. 47, 50 (2004) (noting that “forecasting
a result [in Vieth] is hopeless,” but identifying as one “real possibility” that the case would produce
“a split decision that leaves the law either unchanged or even less certain than it is now”).
191. In his Vieth dissent, Justice Stevens announced that “our opinions referring to political
gerrymanders have consistently assumed that they were at least undesirable, and we always have
indicated that political considerations are among those factors that may not dominate districting
decisions.” Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1811 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But the cases he cites in support of
that claim—Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973);
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966); Fortson v.
Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965)—do not strictly bear it out, for all involved decisions to resort to
multi-member districts, not the decisions of how to draw the lines separating single-member
districts. Moreover, the lead case in the series, Fortson, specifically left as an open question the
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advantage in redistricting is sometimes unconstitutional.192 Also, all justices
agreed that whether the relevant constitutional prohibition should be
judicially enforced depends, at least in part, on whether the Court can craft a
judicially manageable standard.193
The central question that divided the Court in Vieth is the same issue
that has confounded the judicial response to partisan gerrymandering since
Bandemer and, indirectly, since Colegrove: whether the courts can develop
manageable standards for policing the practice.
But as Kennedy’s
concurrence rightly argues, the problem of manageability is really two
analytically distinct problems, not one.194 Unfortunately, as I will argue
below, the precise way in which Kennedy conceptualizes the first of the two
problems risks obscuring as much as it illuminates. But his core claim that
there are two problems remains of critical importance. All members of Vieth
agreed that some forms of partisan gerrymandering are unconstitutional. We
cannot hope for progress in crafting judicially manageable standards for
curbing the practice until we carefully tease apart the twin elements that
comprise the manageability challenge.195
constitutionality of a multi-member districting scheme that “operate[s] to minimize or cancel out the
voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population.” Fortson, 379 U.S. at 439.
192. See, e.g., Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1785 (plurality opinion) (implying agreement with the
proposition that “severe partisan gerrymanders [are incompatible] with democratic principles” and
“violate the Constitution”); id. (acknowledging that an “excessive injection of politics [into
districting] is unlawful”); id. at 1793 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (explaining that redistricting violates
the Constitution when a state applies political “classifications . . . in an invidious manner or in a
way unrelated to any legitimate legislative objective”); id. at 1798 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(agreeing with the plurality that “partisan gerrymandering that disfavors one party is [not]
permissible”); id. at 1810 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that “partisanship [can] be a permissible
consideration in drawing district lines, so long as it does not predominate”); id. at 1815 (Souter, J.,
dissenting joined by Ginsburg, J.) (acknowledging “that some intent to gain political advantage is
inescapable whenever political bodies devise a district plan” and describing the equal protection
issue as “one of how much [partisanship] is too much”); id. at 1824–25 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(arguing that “the legislature’s use of political boundary drawing considerations ordinarily does not
violate the Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause,” but that there are circumstances “where use of
purely political boundary-drawing factors can amount to a serious, and remediable, abuse”)
(emphasis in original).
193. But see Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 181 (manuscript at 21) (observing rightly that,
although the plurality opinion ultimately rested only on the manageability prong of Baker, “it began
with an intriguing feint in the direction of treating gerrymandering claims as nonjusticiable” on
Baker’s textually demonstrable commitment prong).
194. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1793 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[W]hen presented with a claim of
injury from partisan gerrymandering, courts confront two obstacles. First is the lack of
comprehensive and neutral principles for drawing electoral boundaries . . . . Second is the absence
of rules to limit and confine judicial intervention.”).
195. Rick Hasen likewise observes that “the judicial manageability debate in Vieth conflates
two separate concerns.” Rick Hasen, Looking for Standards (in All the Wrong Places): Partisan
Gerrymandering Claims after Vieth 5 (July 2004) (unpublished manuscript on file with Texas Law
Review). But he describes these two concerns as “one about consistency of result across the courts
and a second about the justifiability of a standard for judging partisan gerrymandering claims.” Id.
The twin concerns on which I will focus (and which I do not think Vieth fully conflates) involve,
first, the elucidation of excessive partisanship as a matter of constitutional meaning and, second, the
manageability of judicial doctrine crafted to administer that meaning.
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I have just said that all members of the Vieth Court acknowledged that
pursuit of partisan aims in redistricting violates the Constitution under some
circumstances. They acknowledged as well that the challenge is to craft a
manageable standard for enforcing the constitutional prohibition.196 But my
claim that this challenge is comprised of two analytically distinct
components does not hold true for all views of the circumstances under
which partisan gerrymandering is unconstitutional. We can get a better grasp
on the nature of the discrete tasks by understanding why this is so.
The most important difference of opinion concerning what constitutes
unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering is this: For many members of the
Court, some recourse to partisanship in districting is constitutional; the
Constitution forbids only that pursuit of partisan advantage which is
excessive or otherwise improper. For Justice Stevens, in contrast, any
pursuit of partisan advantage in redistricting is unconstitutional.197
For one who holds Stevens’s view, the problem of manageability really
does present just one challenge: the judiciary must articulate a standard or
test that permits courts to adjudicate this rather clear principle in a
“manageable” fashion. Now, the criteria that bear upon whether given
doctrine is manageable are not self-evident. Surely not all respects in which
proposed constitutional doctrine might be considered defective count against
that doctrine’s “manageability.”
After all, “unmanageable” is not
synonymous with “unwise” or “imprudent” or “undesirable, all things
considered.” Yet Justices have disagreed concerning precisely which of the
many sorts of features that might render doctrine suboptimal count against
that doctrine’s “manageability.”198 And if there is no consensus regarding
the sorts of defects that count in the manageability calculus at all (and
because manageability is a continuum concept not a binary one), so much

196. See, e.g., Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1777–79 (plurality opinion) (pointing out that since “there are
yet no agreed upon substantive principles of fairness in districting, we have no basis on which to
define clear, manageable, and politically neutral standards for measuring the particular burden a
given partisan classification imposes on representational rights”).
197. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1801 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
198. See, for example, supra note 104. That given doctrine is likely to produce unpredictable
and inconsistent results are paradigmatic considerations that bear upon its “manageability.” Not so,
it seems to me, that the doctrine either generates interbranch friction because it often results in
judicial holdings that the state acted unconstitutionally, or provokes substantial litigation by overly
optimistic plaintiffs. This is not to contend that judges may not take these factors into account when
crafting doctrine. Whether they may is an important and challenging question. See Berman,
Constitutional Decision Rules, supra note 18, at 88–100. My point here is only to question whether
these sorts of flaws are the sorts of flaws that count against the doctrine’s “manageability” and that
are therefore properly taken into account for purposes of deciding whether a claim raises a
nonjusticiable political question. For a like recognition that Baker’s “judicially manageable
standards” criterion is not intended to cover the full range of respects in which judicial standards
might be thought nonideal, but is instead “focused firmly on the Court’s ability to do a good job
deciding the case,” see Sanford Levinson & Ernest A. Young, Who’s Afraid of the Twelfth
Amendment?, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 925, 957 (2001).
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more certainly will Justices and judges disagree over whether a particular
proposed doctrine presents the relevant sorts of defects, or threatens the
relevant sorts of unfortunate consequences, to sufficient degree to warrant
labeling that doctrine unmanageable (rather than, say, “manageable enough,
though less manageable than we’d like”). Notwithstanding these important
caveats, however, for those who believe that the Constitution prohibits any
pursuit of partisan advantage in redistricting, the heart of the manageability
challenge is easy to grasp: we need an in-court test, rule, or standard that
does an adequate job of catching those cases in which partisanship has been
present, without relying upon too much judicial subjectivity in application
and generating too much unpredictability and instability (or, perhaps,
producing other kindred ills).
Things are different for those—a majority in Vieth—who believe that
pursuit of partisan advantage is constitutionally permissible so long as it is
not “excessive.”199 Like Justice Stevens, they must be able to meet what we
might call the challenge of manageability proper: they must articulate a
judicial decisional procedure that is not so indeterminate as to make results in
partisan gerrymandering cases “disparate and inconsistent.”200 But adherents
of the view that partisanship in redistricting becomes unconstitutional only
when excessive confront a challenge that Justice Stevens does not: they must
provide some content or meaning to the wholly vague notion of “excessive
partisanship.”201
199. In Cox v. Larios, 124 S. Ct. 2806 (2004), a post-Vieth case in which the Court summarily
affirmed a lower court judgment that Georgia’s state legislative reapportionment violated one
person, one vote, Justice Scalia observed that every Justice in Vieth, save Stevens, agreed that the
pursuit of partisan advantage in redistricting is permissible “so long as it does not go too far.” Id. at
2809 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
200. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1793 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
201. I take this point to be comparable, but possibly not identical, to Kennedy’s reference to the
need for a “subsidiary standard.” Id. at 1797 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Heather K.
Gerken, The Costs and Causes of Minimalism in Voting Cases: Baker v. Carr and Its Progeny, 80
N.C. L. REV. 1411, 1413–14 (2002) (explaining that implementing Baker required the Court to
settle on a “mediating” principle or theory to give content to the foundational norm of equality that
Baker endorsed). Compare, as well, Keith Whittington’s distinction between constitutional
interpretation and constitutional construction.
See generally KEITH E. WHITTINGTON,
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999);
KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL
INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999). We might say that, having interpreted the Constitution to
prohibit excessive partisanship, the Court ought then to develop a construction of that interpreted
meaning.
Closer to home, Backstrom, Robins, and Eller distinguish two concepts that are involved in the
judicial quest to police partisan gerrymandering—measures and standards:
A measure is a device or method of detecting and calibrating disparities. A standard
is how great that disparity must be to constitute an inequity . . . or a discrimination . . . .
Thus in dealing with partisan gerrymandering, the Court will have to first adopt a
measure to ascertain whether and to what degree a disparity is present, and then choose
a standard of how much disparity is acceptable before a specific districting act will be
overturned.
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The plurality makes this point—that those adherents have not
successfully accomplished this analytically primary task—when criticizing
Justice Souter for skipping too quickly to offer his two-step, five-part test.
Souter’s test is intended to cure the problems of subjectivity and
indeterminacy.202 The plurality, recall, doubts that the test responds
adequately even to those problems. More fundamentally, however, they
chastise Souter for proposing a test without first giving more concrete
meaning to the notion of excessive partisanship: “No test—yea, not even a
five-part test—can possibly be successful unless one knows what he is
testing for.”203 The plurality is right. A satisfactory test must not only avoid
the evils of unconstrained discretion; it must also adequately fit the
underlying violation.204
Without a clearer definition of excessive
partisanship, we cannot know whether Souter’s test does a tolerable job of
separating excessive partisanship from permissible partisanship.205
This is Justice Kennedy’s point as well. His appeal to some acceptable
“substantive definition of fairness in districting” is best understood, I think,
as a plea that meaning be given to the amorphous notion of “excessive
partisanship.”206 Unfortunately, Kennedy’s suggestion that we need an
understanding of fairness in districting to make meaningful the notion of
excessive partisanship is mistaken. We can give content or meaning to
“excessive partisanship” without adopting a prior understanding of fairness.
Indeed, Kennedy might have things exactly backwards: an understanding of
what is a fair redistricting could be a function of an understanding of how
much partisanship is excessive, not the reverse. This would be so if what
makes some degree of partisanship excessive is not the fact that it is
inherently unfair but that it is likely to produce other sorts of ills, such as that
it undermines democracy.
The remainder of this Article assumes, as a majority of Justices in Vieth
plainly have accepted, that a gerrymander is unconstitutional when it
excessively pursues partisan advantage in districting.207 And it pursues, in

Backstrom et al., supra note 114, at 159–60. Although that is a useful distinction, the subject on
which I aim to focus attention—what is meant by excessive partisanship—is conceptually prior to
both measure and standard, as the authors employ those terms.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 131–37.
203. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1787 (plurality opinion).
204. I recently argued that Commerce Clause doctrine would also benefit from greater judicial
sensitivity to this lesson. See Mitchell N. Berman, Guillen and Gullibility: Piercing the Surface of
Commerce Clause Doctrine, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1487, 1527–29 (2004) [hereinafter Berman, Guillen
and Gullibility].
205. Indeed, it appears that Souter’s test is better designed to capture any partisanship than the
subset of extreme or excessive partisanship.
206. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1793 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
207. This is least clear in the case of Justice Breyer. In arguing that it is unconstitutional for a
party with minority popular support to entrench itself in power through partisan manipulation of
district lines, Breyer left open whether partisan gerrymandering could be unconstitutional in other
circumstances too. My own view is that “unjustified entrenchment” of a minority party as a
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three steps, a manageable standard for administering this constitutional
principle. This Part takes the first step by explaining that the notion of
“excessive partisanship” is not only amorphous, but also ambiguous.208 That
is, the effort to give content to the idea of excessive partisanship can take one
in identifiably distinct directions. This Part, accordingly, describes what
might be meant, and what should be meant, by excessive pursuit of partisan
advantage.209
A. The Meanings of Excessive Partisanship
If the Constitution prohibits “too much partisanship”210 in districting, it
must permit some partisanship.211 It might seem to follow, as Justice Souter
majority and “unjustified entrenchment” of a majority party as a supermajority are not meaningfully
distinguishable as a constitutional matter. For one thing, where congressional redistricting is at
issue, majority-to-supermajority entrenchment at the state level can produce minority-to-majority
entrenchment at the national level.
Second, even if we focus only at the state level, Breyer’s narrow concern with minority-tomajority entrenchment seems not to adequately appreciate the feedback mechanism that can obtain
between popular support and electoral success. For example, the likelihood that a potential voter
will cast a ballot is probably proportional, all things being equal, to her perception of the likelihood
that her favored party will control the legislature. Put otherwise, persons who are actual or potential
supporters of a minority party are more energized and more likely to vote when they believe that
becoming an electoral majority is possible. Consequently, the fact that a party enjoys popular
majority support at one point in time can itself be partly a function of the fact that, at an earlier point
in time, it engaged in partisan manipulations to translate a bare electoral majority into an electoral
supermajority.
For these reasons, I believe that the distinction between minority-to-majority entrenchment and
majority-to-supermajority entrenchment that Breyer at least contemplates is not ultimately tenable.
(And even were it a normatively attractive distinction as a matter of constitutional meaning, to
embody the distinction in constitutional doctrine would only compound the manageability problem
in cases of closely divided states—as my colleague Douglas Laycock has pointed out to me.)
Accordingly, I will read Breyer’s dissent as expressing the following three-part view: that excessive
partisanship in gerrymandering is unconstitutional; that one circumstance in which a partisan
gerrymander is unconstitutionally excessive is when it results in unjustified entrenchment; and that
the concept of excessive partisanship is otherwise underspecified at present.
208. Rick Pildes has observed that “[l]aw and social science are perhaps nowhere more
mutually dependent than in the voting-rights field.” Richard H. Pildes, Is Voting-Rights Law Now
at War with Itself? Social Science and Voting Rights in the 2000s, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1517, 1518
(2002). He may well be right; I don’t know. The dependence has not, however, been an
unmitigated good. It has encouraged lawyers and legal scholars to argue first in terms of what is
measurable without taking pains to ascertain what we would like to measure if we could.
209. This strategy can also be read as a partial response to a telling criticism of Bandemer that
Daniel Lowenstein leveled fifteen years ago. See generally Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Bandemer’s
Gap: Gerrymandering and Equal Protection, in POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS,
supra note 13, at 64. Disagreeing with those who had attributed the confusion that had greeted the
Supreme Court’s decision to the plurality’s failure “to lay down sufficiently clear ‘standards’ for the
adjudication of gerrymandering cases,” id. at 65, Lowenstein diagnosed, as “[t]he true source of
confusion in interpreting Bandemer,” the plurality’s provision of “an incomplete definition and
explanation of the nature of the constitutional violation that may inhere in a partisan gerrymander.”
Id. at 66. “[R]ules or standards to govern matters of great complexity,” he further observed, “cannot
be precise or comprehensive enough to give adequate guidance in particular cases without an
explanation of the principles that those rules and standards are intended to implement.” Id. at 67.
210. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1815 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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observed and the plurality agreed, that “the issue is one of how much is too
much.”212 And so it does. But not immediately. Before we can hope to
identify and articulate even a remotely intelligent answer to Souter’s
question, we will need a clearer grasp on what it means for partisanship to be
present a lot rather than a little. And for this, we will need to articulate a
measure in which the partisanship of the scheme will be quantified, and we
will need to identify a baseline against which the challenged districting
scheme will be compared. Each of these needs, I will propose, comes in two
varieties: the measure can be (what we may inelegantly call) “cost-based” or
“ends-based”; the baseline can be normative or positive. Because the choices
of measure and baseline are independent of each other, we are left with a 2 X
2 matrix of possibilities for conceptualizing amounts of partisanship.
This subpart argues that the usual ways of conceptualizing “too much
partisanship” are misguided; in effect, judges and scholars have been looking
in the wrong boxes of the matrix. It then explains that the better concept and
measure of too much partisanship consist of measuring an ends-based
conceptualization against a positive baseline. Correct conceptualization will
put us in position to meet the plurality’s challenge to Justice Souter—i.e., to
explicate what we’re testing for—without adopting an answer to that
question as lenient as that accepted by Justice Stevens (any partisanship in
districting) or as stringent as that at least entertained by Justice Breyer (only
the use of partisanship to entrench a minority as a majority).
1. Two Scalar Measures of Partisanship.—Although commentators
often draw attention to the need for a baseline,213 the more fundamental, yet
less obvious, need is to conceptualize partisanship in a way that is amenable
to assessment in quantitative terms. Put otherwise, we need to conceptualize
partisanship as a scalar concept,214 so that it can be present in greater or lesser
degree.
It is fairly easy (though not entirely unproblematic) to conceptualize
partisanship in binary terms, as present or absent. Partisanship in

211. This is open to quibble. Literally speaking, one could maintain both that the Constitution
prohibits too much partisanship and that any partisanship is too much. But the more straightforward
way to convey this idea is that the Constitution prohibits any partisanship in districting. So I will
stand by the statement in the text.
212. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1815 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 1788 (plurality opinion).
213. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem,
85 GEO. L.J. 491, 542 (1997) (arguing that “judicial competence turns on the existence of an
uncontroversial baseline against which to measure entrenchment effects”); Pildes, Democratic
Politics, supra note 165, at 59 (“The difficulty for courts addressing gerrymandering has long been
thought to be defining a baseline for what constitutes a party’s ‘proper’ share of political
representation given the distribution of votes.”).
214. Scalar measures are customarily distinguished from vectors, in possessing only magnitude,
not direction as well. Here, I am distinguishing scalars from binaries.
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redistricting refers, first and foremost, to partisan motivation.215 So to ask
whether partisanship lay behind any given redistricting is equivalent to
asking whether the legislature216 drew district lines, or otherwise decided
how the electoral system would be structured,217 with a purpose of promoting
a favored party’s electoral chances. In a mixed-motive case, we frequently
conceptualize issues of this sort in but-for terms:218 Would the lines have
been drawn just as they were drawn had the legislature not sought to promote
the party’s electoral chances?
But if partisan motivation was present,219 if the redistricter acted for the
purpose of realizing partisan advantage, what does it mean for that
motivation to be present more or less, a little or a lot? Until we settle on an
answer to this question, the ultimate issue that six Justices (the plurality plus
Justices Souter and Ginsburg) explicitly identify as central—“how much is
too much”—will be unanswerable.
This point can hardly be overemphasized because there are at least two
plausible ways to make sense of partisan motivation as a scalar concept.
Partisanship in redistricting, recall, refers to a certain sort of purpose—a
purpose to promote a favored party’s electoral prospects. One way to think

215. That is, when we speak of “partisanship” in redistricting, we are referring to the character
of the purposes, motives, or intentions held by the actors responsible for the redistricting. A
partisan purpose or partisan motivation is an “intent to gain political advantage.” Vieth, 124 S. Ct.
at 1815 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1801 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing that, for
claims of gerrymandering, “purpose [is] the ultimate inquiry”); id. at 1788 (plurality opinion)
(discussing “efforts to maximize partisan representation”). To have a partisan purpose is to use, as a
line-drawing “consideration,” predictions regarding the expected electoral success of a party’s
candidates under different scenarios.
216. Except where otherwise specified, I will assume that the redistricting authority is the
legislature, so I speak interchangeably of “legislatures” and “redistricters.”
217. Attention to the structure of the system and not only to the placement of district lines is
necessary to accommodate such decisions as whether and where to replace single-member districts
with multi-member districts. But having flagged this wrinkle, I will now disregard it in what
follows. For ease of analysis and exposition I shall marginally simplify the problem of partisan
gerrymandering by assuming that the redistricting decision consists of deciding where to locate the
boundaries of single-member districts.
218. Relying on but-for causation here produces familiar difficulties in cases of causal
overdetermination, which I am content to put aside.
219. We can say that partisan motivation was present, and causally efficacious, if the final
product would not have been precisely as it was if the legislature had not been motivated, at all, by
that purpose. We could also say that partisan motivation was effective, or produced a partisan
effect, if the final product did in fact result in the election of more members of the legislature’s
preferred party than would likely have been elected had the partisan motivation not been present.
Precisely because we could be concerned with whether the partisan motivation succeeded in
achieving its partisan effects, we might not want to reduce partisanship in redistricting to partisan
motivation alone. This is why I say, above, that “partisanship in redistricting refers, first and
foremost, to partisan motivation.” At the same time, to reduce the notion of partisanship in
redistricting to partisan effects alone, without regard for partisan motivation, is to fundamentally
misconceive the character of the phenomenon under investigation. Here, then, is one rarely noted
difference between malapportionment and gerrymandering: malapportionment is entirely a function
of effects, gerrymandering is centrally about purposes.

2005]

Managing Gerrymandering

817

about that purpose as being present in greater or lesser degree is cost-based.
The amount, or weight, of partisanship at work is a function of what the
redistricter has paid to realize its partisan goal. And payment, in this context,
is measured in terms of how much satisfaction of competing interests the
legislature has willingly foregone to achieve its end. The more that the
redistricter has sacrificed for partisan advantage, the more partisanship it has
exhibited. A second and contrasting way to think about partisanship in
quantitative terms is ends-based. Under this conception, the measure of
partisanship is supplied by the partisan advantage sought. The greater the
electoral advantage that the legislature has tried to secure, the greater its
partisan motivation.220
Choosing between the cost-based and ends-based conceptions of
partisanship is necessary in order to supply content to the “how much” part
of the ultimate issue on which Justices Souter and Scalia alike are focused—
“How much partisanship is too much?” For without settling on one or the
other conceptualization, we have no basis for determining whether a given
redistricting reflects a lot of partisan motivation or a little.
To see that this is so, suppose that redistricters in State A, which is
controlled by Party A, pursued only marginal partisan advantage—say, they
tried to eke out only one more seat for their party221—but at substantial cost,
as measured by the extent to which other values were sacrificed to this goal.
That is, let us assume, the redistricters did value (or should have valued)
compactness of districts and the integrity of political subdivisions, but ended
up adopting a scheme that is very noncompact and slices through
subdivisions right and left, all in order to pick up that marginal increase in
seats—say, one. In contrast, suppose that redistricters in State B, controlled
by Party B, aim to satiate a large appetite for partisan gain. And as it
happens, the geographic and demographic characteristics of that state enable
them to achieve their goal at little sacrifice to traditional districting criteria
such as compactness or respect for political subdivisions. The resulting map
does not look odd, but it gives Party B many more seats.
In sum, redistricters in State A pursued slight partisan ends at substantial
cost. Their counterparts in State B pursued substantial partisan ends at slight
cost. Which scheme exhibits or embodies more partisanship? It depends.
Until we self-consciously conceptualize partisanship in cost-based or endsbased terms, we can’t know, even in principle, whether more partisanship
affected redistricting in State A or in State B. For this reason, adopting one
220. In order for these two measures to be different, we must assume that the units of cost are
not themselves defined by reference to the ends sought, namely seats-per-party. This is, of course, a
fair assumption in this context: some considerations other than partisan advantage do and should
matter to redistricters.
221. “‘Only one more seat’ than what?” you might wonder. That will indeed be the next
question. See infra section II(A)(2).
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or the other conception of partisanship is a necessary step to give content to
the notion of excessive partisanship.222
2. Two Baselines for Measurement.—It is not, however, sufficient. The
previous discussion speaks in terms of how many more seats the
gerrymandering party obtained and the extent to which they sacrificed other
considerations. But in order to make sense of either notion, we need a
baseline. How many more seats than what? From what starting point do we
assess the magnitude of any sacrifice?
The gerrymandering literature supplies a common answer:
unconstitutionally excessive partisanship is reliance on partisanship that
departs too far from what fairness dictates. As my colleague Sandy Levinson
put it, “[J]udicial intervention with regard to gerrymandering will require
analysis of the substantive fairness of representation . . . .”223 This is a
normative baseline. Starting with some notion of what, ideally, the
legislature should have done, proponents of this approach ask whether what
the legislature actually did departs too far from this normative ideal. The
alternative is to measure the actual plan against a non-normative, or positive,
standard. Such a positive baseline could take a variety of forms. In theory,
for example, it could be constituted by what the legislature of some actual or
hypothetical State C would have done, or what the plaintiff’s attorneys
propose. It seems to me, however, that the most sensible positive baseline is
counterfactual—what the actual redistricters would have done had they not
been motivated at all to achieve partisan outcomes.224 Accordingly, and at
the admitted risk of some oversimplification, the following analysis contrasts

222. At the urging of Micah Altman, let me make clear that neither the cost-based nor the endsbased conception would capture the redistricters’ utility function with respect to tradeoffs between
seat and nonseat districting considerations.
223. Sanford Levinson, Gerrymandering and the Brooding Omnipresence of Proportional
Representation: Why Won’t It Go Away?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 257, 281 (1985); see also Pildes,
Democratic Politics, supra note 165, at 66 (noting that common view that, “if the Court is going to
rule excessive partisan gerrymandering unconstitutional, it must first be able to specify a fair
partisan distribution of districts”).
224. The most familiar of such “positive baseline” approaches would measure the expected
partisan consequences of the actual plan against the outcomes that could be expected under
randomly generated plans. For a proposal of this sort, see Richard L. Engstrom, The Supreme Court
and Equipopulous Gerrymandering: A Remaining Obstacle in the Quest for Fair and Effective
Representation, 1976 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 277, 316–18; for criticisms, see Daniel H. Lowenstein &
Jonathan Steinberg, The Quest for Legislative Districting in the Public Interest: Elusive or
Illusory?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1, 56–62 (1985), and Richard G. Niemi, The Relationship Between
Votes and Seats: The Ultimate Question in Political Gerrymandering, 33 UCLA L. REV. 185, 207–
08 (1985). Relatedly, one commentator has proposed that redistricting plans be measured for
excessive partisanship against the baseline of what a hypothetical bipartisan commission would
have done. Michael E. Lewyn, How To Limit Gerrymandering, 45 FLA. L. REV. 403 (1993). These
formulations might constitute useful proxies for the counterfactual baseline, but do not otherwise
have much to recommend them, I think. Their possible value as heuristics will be considered infra
subpart IV(A).
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the normative baseline with the counterfactual one, rather than with the more
generic positive baseline.
Because each of the two measures of partisanship set forth in the
previous section could be measured against both counterfactual (positive)
and normative baselines, we are left with four distinct ways—each of which
is quantitatively sensitive—to conceptualize partisanship in redistricting.
These different conceptions do not, I reiterate, specifically address the
question of how much partisanship is “too much”; they speak to the
analytically prior question of how to understand how much partisanship there
has been.225 (See Table.)
CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF PARTISANSHIP IN REDISTRICTING
Normative Baseline

Counterfactual Baseline

Cost-based Measure

2

3

Ends-based Measure

1

4

The amount of partisanship present under a cost-based, counterfactualbaseline conception (Box 3) is determined by asking: Compared to the
considerations that the redistricters would have employed, and thus
compared to the state of the world that the redistricters would have brought
about had they not considered party advantage at all, to what extent were
those considerations and outcomes226 sacrificed in the actually adopted
redistricting scheme? The amount of partisanship at work under a costbased, normative-baseline conception (Box 2) is determined by asking the
nearly identical question, replacing “would” with “should”: Compared to the
considerations that the redistricters should have employed, and thus
compared to the state of the world that the redistricters should have brought
about had they not considered party advantage at all, to what extent were
those considerations and outcomes sacrificed in the actually adopted
redistricting scheme?
An ends-based, normative-baseline view (Box 1) conceptualizes amount
of partisanship as a function of the number of seats the redistricting party
expects under its adopted plan compared to the number of seats it should
225. Readers familiar with the partisan gerrymandering literature may discern some points of
similarity between these four conceptions and the common trichotomy among “formal,” “resultoriented,” and “process-oriented” gerrymandering criteria. See Bruce E. Cain, Simple vs. Complex
Criteria for Partisan Gerrymandering: A Comment on Niemi and Grofman, 33 UCLA L. REV. 213,
214 (1985). Any resemblance is only superficial. I am classifying ways to conceptualize how much
partisanship is present in any given redistricting scheme. I am not yet attending to what the
judicially manageable test should be. The districting criteria that law professors and political
scientists discuss, taxonomize, and critique are often proposed as full or partial answers to that
analytically distinct and logically subsequent question.
226. By “outcomes,” here and later in this paragraph, I mean mostly formal features like levels
of average district compactness, not electoral outcomes.
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receive or to which it is entitled. Lastly, an ends-based, counterfactualbaseline conception (Box 4) measures partisanship in terms of the number of
seats the redistricting party expects under its adopted plan compared to the
number of seats it would have expected had it not pursued partisan ends.
This effort to identify the range of distinct ways in which partisanship
can be intelligibly conceptualized in scalar terms is not a scholastic exercise.
It provides a powerful framework for critically assessing extant judicial and
scholarly arguments that purport to show that the judiciary could not
manageably police the practice of partisan gerrymandering. The framework
will show that the conclusion does not follow from the arguments because
critics almost universally focus their fire on only one of these four
conceptions of excessive partisanship without recognizing the availability of
others.
B. Three Wrong Turns
1. The Specter of Proportional Representation.—The particular
normative baseline most frequently discussed in the gerrymandering
literature is supplied by principles of proportional representation.227
According to this view, the ideally fair scheme of electoral representation
would apportion seats in proportion to the parties’ respective shares of the
votes cast. Some departure from this ideal can be permitted. But it is
unconstitutional for a redistricting plan to depart too far from proportionality
in pursuit of partisan gain.
As Justice O’Connor’s Bandemer concurrence exemplifies,228 the notion
that we can make sense of unconstitutionally partisan gerrymandering only
by measuring a challenged scheme against the baseline of proportional
representation is frequently affirmed by those who would declare claims of
partisan gerrymandering nonjusticiable.229 Simply put, they argue, regardless
of whether proportional representation is an attractive electoral system—and
political scientists are increasingly divided on the question—it is not a
system with constitutional credentials. Nothing in our constitutional text or
history supports the judgment that states act unconstitutionally by creating
voting mechanisms and district lines that produce wholly disproportional
representation.
Tellingly, it is hard to find a dissenter. Those who argue that some
forms of partisanship in districting are unconstitutional, and should be
justiciable, rarely explicitly propose proportional representation as the
standard against which challenged schemes can be measured for
227. See, e.g., Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 224, at 52 (“The most popular conception of
how votes and seats in legislative elections should be related is that they should be proportional.”).
228. See supra text accompanying note 97.
229. See, e.g., Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 224, at 15.
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constitutionality and often take great pains to insist otherwise.230 But their
opponents often contend that they have no alternative. As Peter Schuck has
argued, “[C]ourts attempting to adjudicate partisan gerrymandering claims
will find it impossible to vindicate those claims unless they adopt a
proportional representation standard.”231
Our taxonomy of conceptualizations reveals that this is not so. A model
of excessive partisanship that is conceptually dependent upon the ideal of
proportional representation falls in Box 1: it is an ends-based conception
measured against a normative baseline.232 Accordingly, the generally
accepted proposition that no party or community is constitutionally entitled
to proportionate representation in the legislature—hence that proportional
representation cannot constitute an appropriate normative baseline—reveals,
at most, only that the appropriate conceptualization of excessive partisanship
resides elsewhere than in Box 1.
2. Fairness in Districting.—But where? Let us start again with the
notion of what it means for partisanship to be present at all. Districting is a
reason-directed activity. Mapmakers draw district lines in order to advance
some combination of ends. Put otherwise, the drawing of lines is responsive
to practical reason. It is not performance art.233 Legitimate objectives in the
shaping of electoral districts include (and are nearly limited to) the following:
guarding against excessive population disparities, maintaining contiguity and
compactness, following major geographical features like rivers and
mountains, tracking political subdivisions, preserving communities of
interest, ensuring no diminution in the voting strength of racial and ethnic
minorities, protecting incumbents, securing public acceptance, and
230. See, e.g., Bernard Grofman, Criteria for Districting: A Social Science Perspective, 33
UCLA L. REV. 77, 158–59 (1985) [hereinafter Grofman, Criteria for Districting] (“The relevant
question in analysis of partisan gerrymandering is not whether proportionality has been achieved (it
will not have been), but rather whether there have been egregious violations of fairness in terms of
inequality of treatment.”); Niemi, supra note 224, at 186 (“I argue that ultimately the Court will
have to confront directly the gerrymandering issue; but I maintain that the Court need not in any
way support proportional representation.”).
231. Peter Schuck, Partisan Gerrymandering: A Political Problem Without Judicial Solution,
in POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS, supra note 13, at 240, 240; see also Levinson,
supra note 223 (arguing that approaches to claims of partisan gerrymandering can be driven by
structural or rights-based concerns and that those who adopt the latter perspective will be irresistibly
drawn to proportional representation).
232. Some readers might be inclined to view the proportional representation model also as
falling within Box 2: How much of the ideal proportionate representation does the actual scheme
sacrifice? But for reasons suggested earlier, see supra note 220, if we measure what a redistricter
sacrifices in order to achieve partisan advantage by reference to the very thing the pursuit of which
causes the cost to be sustained—a party’s seats in the legislature—then the distinction between the
cost-based and ends-based measures collapses.
233. But consider Congressman Phillip Burton, architect of the notorious 1981 California
congressional redistricting, who defended his blatant Democratic gerrymander as a “contribution to
modern art.” See JOHN JACOBS, A RAGE FOR JUSTICE: THE PASSION AND POLITICS OF PHILLIP
BURTON 435 (1995).
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promoting party electoral success. These are possible purposes. It is not the
case that a given redistricter attends to all of these purposes all of the time.
But perhaps legislatures ought to weigh or respect these various sorts of
considerations in some particular manner. Perhaps, for example, they ought
to ensure that all districts fall within some specified percentage of the
average district’s population, are contiguous, and undivided by hard-totraverse geographic features; that each is maximally compact; that once
compactness of districts is assured, integrity of political subdivisions should
be maintained to the greatest extent possible; and that, if no single
redistricting plan is yet determined, communities of interest should be
preserved.234
A formula or recipe of this sort would provide a normative baseline
against which a challenged districting plan could be measured. But whereas
the normative baseline of proportional representation is ends-based, this
normative baseline is cost-based. It depends on the difference, not between
what the balance of legislative seats should have been and what it is, but
between how the legislature should have balanced competing districting
considerations and how it did so. We are now in Box 2, not Box 1. The
hope, however, remains the same. If we could reach agreement on principles
of fairness in districting—how the legislature ought to accommodate
competing districting considerations—we could speak intelligently about
whether some challenged redistricting plan departs too far from fair
principles.
Kennedy’s ruminations about principles of fair districting can be read in
just this way. By complaining that the Court’s “attention ha[d] not been
drawn to statements of principled, well-accepted rules of fairness that should
govern districting, or to helpful formulations of the legislator’s duty in
drawing district lines,”235 Kennedy strongly implies that we could develop a
rough sense of what a redistricting scheme should look like if only we could
agree on what fairness in districting requires—how much regard for
compactness, how much regard for political subdivisions, et cetera. If a
challenged district does not look like the ideally fair district, and if the
departure from ideally fair lines seems well explained by pursuit of partisan
advantage, then we can conclude that partisan motivation was present.
Moreover, the greater the gap between the extent to which each interest
should be realized and its actual realization, the greater the pursuit of partisan
advantage.
234. See, e.g., Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 224, at 4 (arguing that, in order to identify a
gerrymander in a pejorative sense, we would need to “identify ‘neutral’ or ‘pre-political’ public
interest criteria for legislative districting which could command assent from persons who, despite
opposing partisan affiliations and diverse ideological viewpoints, share a commitment to democratic
processes and values”).
235. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769, 1794 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Plainly, an approach of this sort would confront difficulties in
application.236 The more fundamental difficulty, however, is simply that we
do not have a normative baseline of this sort237—which, of course, is also
Kennedy’s point. Without judicial acceptance of principles of fair districting
that direct how redistricters should pursue each of the legitimate districting
interests, we cannot create the normative baseline against which a cost-based
conception of excessive partisanship must be measured.
3. Compactness Fetishists.—Justice Kennedy is right to observe that we
lack agreement on principles of fair districting that tell us how much
realization of various interests a legislature should pursue and that, therefore,
enable us to draw the normatively ideal district lines. But one might think it
a little naïve to suppose that a more thorough investigation into relevant
historical materials could conceivably produce what we are looking for.
Were it true that manageable standards for administering the constitutional
ban on excessive partisanship in districting depend upon our ability to
articulate and agree upon principles of fair districting in the sense I have
described, then Kennedy might as well have joined the plurality in Vieth. A
search for fair principles of this sort is a fool’s errand.238
Long before Vieth, many commentators had argued just that—we
cannot agree on principles of fairness in districting and should, therefore,
declare partisan gerrymandering nonjusticiable.239 Some who agree with the
premise reject the conclusion. Even if we cannot reach agreement on what
constitutes fair, they reason, we can recognize cases that are unfair.240 As a
general proposition, this is plainly true. But I am skeptical that the insight is
as useful in this context as its proponents may assume. We still need to
articulate this insight in a way that, at the end of the day, can be useful to
courts. A general direction that courts should uphold a challenged district
unless persuaded that it is unfair (or “severely unfair”) will be less intrusive
than a direction that would require reviewing courts to assure themselves of
the plan’s fairness, but not obviously much more easily managed.241

236. To start, political scientists would have to develop, and the courts would have to accept,
individual metrics to measure differences between plans (the actual and the normative) on each of
the possibly relevant dimensions (e.g., compactness, political subdivision integrity, incumbency
protection, and the like). Furthermore, we would need a means to translate deviations on these
distinct dimensions into a single common metric.
237. See Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 224, at 4 (arguing that “there are no coherent
public interest criteria for legislative districting independent of substantive conceptions of the public
interest, disputes about which constitute the very stuff of politics”).
238. For an extended critique of Kennedy’s concurrence on essentially these grounds, see
Hasen, supra note 195.
239. See, e.g., Cain, supra note 225; Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 224.
240. See, e.g., Baker, Unfinished Reapportionment Revolution, supra note 22, at 23–24;
Richard H. Pildes, The Theory of Political Competition, 85 VA. L. REV. 1605, 1611–15 (1999).
241. It is essentially for this reason, I think, that Martin Shapiro, who first pressed the point that
inquiry into the unfair requires far less agreement than does inquiry into the fair, nonetheless
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Fortunately, the premise of Kennedy’s argument—that we cannot give
content to the concept of excessive partisanship without recourse to a
plausible normative baseline, or to “principles of fairness”—is false. We can
conceptualize “too much partisanship” in a fully adequate manner, not by
shifting attention from “fair” to “unfair,” but by abandoning both “fairness”
and “unfairness” as organizing constructs. The better response to Kennedy, I
believe, is that normative baselines fail to capture our intuitive prereflective
conception of excessive partisanship. We need a counterfactual (or, more
generally, positive) baseline, not a normative one. In terms of the 2 X 2
matrix presented earlier, we should be looking in the second column, not the
first.
Once we decide to measure amounts of partisanship by reference to the
state of the world had the redistricters not pursued partisan ends at all, we
still must choose between cost-based and ends-based measures. To repeat, a
cost-based measure (Box 3) asks what the redistricters would have done
absent partisan motives and then determines how far the actual scheme
departs from the counterfactual one on dimensions such as compactness and
the integrity of political subdivisions. The impulse here is simple. All else
being equal, the less compact are the districts in a given redistricting plan
(relative to how compact they would have been had partisanship not been
considered), or the more pieces into which a given redistricting plan carves
up political subdivisions (again, relative to the counterfactual baseline), in
order to advance the dominant party’s chances for electoral success, the
greater the legislature’s partisan motivation.
There are, however, two principal problems with this way of
conceptualizing amounts of partisan motivation. First, the core measurement
challenges that confront a cost-based conception measured against a
normative baseline242 remain when a counterfactual baseline is employed.
This is especially true because “all else” is rarely equal. So if the challenged
scheme is less compact than the counterfactual scheme but happens to better
respect the integrity of political subdivisions, then the question of how much
partisanship is afoot might be conceptually unanswerable.
Second, it is unclear why this particular scalar conception of
partisanship should have any hold on us. Commentators frequently criticize
proposals to use noncompactness as a measure of partisan gerrymandering on
the grounds that if the state is under no obligation to create the most compact
districts—indeed, if it is not obligated to create even minimally compact
districts—then lack of compactness is constitutionally irrelevant. Proponents
of a cost-based, normative-baseline conception accept the conclusion but
deny the antecedent. They claim that redistricters do have some form of

concluded by throwing his lot in with the nonjusticiability crowd. See generally Martin Shapiro,
Gerrymandering, Unfairness, and the Supreme Court, 33 UCLA L. REV. 227 (1985).
242. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
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constitutional duty (even if defeasible) to attend to considerations like
compactness. As we have seen, Justice Kennedy denies (reasonably) that
any such case has been persuasively advanced. But proponents of a costbased, counterfactual-baseline conception do not have even this response
available to them.
If compactness and other sorts of districting
considerations have no independent constitutional significance, why should
we care how greatly a legislature sacrificed such interests in pursuit of
partisan advantage?
C. A Solution
We are left, then, with a final possibility (Box 4): the amount of
partisanship manifested or embodied in a given redistricting scheme is the
delta between the controlling party’s expected electoral success under the
scheme actually adopted and the party’s expected electoral success under the
scheme that the redistricter would have adopted had securing partisan
advantage not been a motivating purpose at all.243
Suppose, for example, that the Republican-controlled Pennsylvania
legislature expected the scheme it adopted after the 2000 census to net the
Republicans thirteen seats in the state’s nineteen-person congressional
delegation. Suppose too that only ten Republicans would have been
expected to win election under the redistricting scheme that the legislature
would have adopted had it not considered partisan advantage at all. We can
now describe the amount of partisanship in play as a function of the
difference between the actually expected thirteen seats and the
counterfactually expected ten seats. To be sure, we could describe this
difference in varied ways—for example, in absolute numbers (three), or as a
percentage increase in the number of expected seats (30%), or as a
percentage of the total delegation (15.8%). But all of these options provide
us, finally, with a way to answer the “how much” part of the question that a
majority of the Justices in Vieth explicitly made central: “how much is too
much?”
No doubt it will have already occurred to you that this conception of
excessive partisanship will confront difficulties in application. Here are
three: (1) the counterfactual problem of ascertaining what the legislature
would have done had it not considered partisan advantage at all; (2) the
prediction problem of estimating how many seats the actual and
counterfactual schemes can be expected to produce for the relevant parties;
and (3) the standard problem of deciding the magnitude of the delta that
separates permissible from excessive.
243. To be sure, a redistricter must be aware of partisan characteristics of the electorate when
trying to pursue other legitimate objectives—most notably incumbent protection, but also, perhaps,
ensuring against diminution in the voting strength of racial and ethnic minorities. See supra section
II(B)(2). But this fact does not transform those purposes into the purpose of securing partisan
advantage.
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All this is true. And Part IV will address the magnitude of these
practical difficulties. For now, it is enough to recognize that they are
problems of application, not conceptualization. As a conceptualization, the
ends-based, counterfactual-baseline approach has significant virtues.
First, it meets the stated need. The ends-based, counterfactual-baseline
conception of the amount of partisanship enables us to reach a conclusion in
the hypothetical case of States A and B.244 Because Party B sought a greater
increase in its electoral fortunes than did Party A, its scheme reflects more
partisanship, even though that greater increase was bought at lower cost.
Second, it meets the need in an acceptable way. It does not rely upon either
the quixotic hope for “principles of fair districting” or the coherent but
unacceptable baseline of proportional representation. Third, it is a structural,
not rights-based approach.245 Most basically, it does not require that we
identify any person whose rights were infringed or “burdened,” or who was
treated “unfairly.”
This approach rests strictly on the assumption
(admittedly, not defended here) that partisan greed246 produces systemic
harms or is antithetical to (constitutionally endorsed) democratic values.247
Fourth, whereas a cost-based conception could apply at both statewide and
individual district levels, this ends-based conception is intelligible only at the
statewide level. Commentators are increasingly recognizing that districtspecific partisan gerrymandering claims are misguided.248 This approach
makes clear why that is so.
Indeed, despite passages from Justice Kennedy’s Vieth opinion that (I
have already suggested) point toward a cost-based, normative-baseline
conceptualization of degrees of partisanship, the ends-based, counterfactualbaseline conceptualization resonates with an otherwise somewhat curious
passage from that concurrence. After noting that the “excessiveness” of

244. See supra text accompanying notes 221–22.
245. The principal academic advocates of a structural approach to election law problems
generally, and to gerrymandering in particular, are Samuel Issacharoff and Rick Pildes, writing
together and separately. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116
HARV. L. REV. 593 (2002) [hereinafter Issacharoff, Political Cartels]; Pildes, supra note 240;
Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic
Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998).
246. I take it to be insightful, not accidental, that election law scholars like Bernard Grofman
refer to “partisan lust,” not “partisan injustice.” See, e.g., Bernard Grofman, Criteria for
Districting: A Social Science Perspective, 33 UCLA L. REV. 77, 114 (1985) (attributing the phrase
to David R. Mayhew, Congressional Reapportionment: Theory and Practice in Drawing the
Districts, in REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE 1970S, at 249, 284 (N. Polsby ed. 1982)).
247. Like other analyses that identify structural or systemic harms, this approach raises
questions regarding the appropriate plaintiffs to satisfy standing doctrine. Although these questions
are answerable, defending any particular solution would consume more space than seems warranted
here.
248. See, e.g., Adam Cox, Partisan Fairness and Redestricting Politics, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 751,
767 n.60 (2004) (“Measuring partisan gerrymandering at [the] institutional levels is common in both
the jurisprudence and the literature . . . .”); Pildes, Democratic Politics, supra note 165, at 73 (“The
concept of an unfair partisan gerrymander of an individual district is not intelligible.”).
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“partisan interests in the redistricting process . . . is not easily determined,”249
Kennedy invites the reader to imagine two redistricting schemes:
In one State, Party X controls the apportionment process and draws
the lines so it captures every congressional seat. In three other States,
Party Y controls the apportionment process. It is not so blatant or
egregious, but proceeds by a more subtle effort, capturing less than all
the seats in each State. Still, the total effect of Party Y’s effort is to
capture more new seats than Party X captured. Party X’s gerrymander
was more egregious. Party Y’s gerrymander was more subtle. In my
view, however, each is culpable.250
For present purposes, the most critical point to observe about this
passage is that Kennedy focuses on the number of seats that a party seeks to
capture, rather than on the extent to which the party disregards traditional
criteria. The measure of partisanship, in short, is ends-based, not cost-based.
Furthermore, in referring ultimately to the number of “new seats” that the
parties have endeavored to capture, the baseline appears positive, not
normative. Conspicuously, Kennedy is not attending to the number of
“undeserved” or “unwarranted” or “unfairly obtained” seats that a party
might obtain.
True, this particular positive baseline is not obviously a counterfactual
one.251 Reference to the number of “new seats” that a party sets out to
capture (and succeeds in capturing) most naturally suggests a comparison,
not to a counterfactual baseline—the number of seats that the party would
have captured had it not specifically set out to capture seats for itself—but to
a historical one—the number of seats that the party used to have. I am
skeptical, however, that a historical baseline is tenable in this context.
Ordinary (on-cycle) redistricting is necessitated by the fact of demographic
change. The district lines must be redrawn. If the status quo simply cannot
be preserved, it is not easy to see why the past ought to be thought directly
relevant.252 Possibly, then, interpreting this passage to imply a historical
baseline reflects a misreading. Perhaps “new seats” is just a shorthand for
those seats that are secured by application of the particular purpose under
investigation, namely the purpose of satisfying “partisan interests.” If this is

249. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769, 1798 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
250. Id. Perhaps the most conspicuous lesson from this passage (though not the one most
immediately relevant) is that Justice Kennedy, seemingly unlike Justice Breyer, see supra note 207,
recognizes that the problem of partisan congressional gerrymandering must ultimately be
appreciated from a nationwide perspective. Because parties exist across state lines and because
congressional gerrymandering by a state impacts a national body, we ought not to think about the
partisan advantages that parties seek wholly in state-by-state isolation.
251. See supra note 224 and accompanying text (explaining that, strictly speaking, the
counterfactual baseline is only a species of positive baselines).
252. It is true that I will later make some use of a historical baseline myself. See infra section
IV(B)(2). But that is as a proxy for the counterfactual baseline, not as a conceptualization of what
excessive partisanship itself means.
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so, the baseline implicitly invoked in this passage is the counterfactual. In
sum (though I don’t insist on the point), it seems to me that the ends-based,
counterfactual-baseline conception of degrees of partisanship makes best
sense of Kennedy’s intriguing hypothetical.
III. From Meaning to Doctrine
We have taken a great stride. By attending seriously to Justice
Kennedy’s observation that the problem of manageability consists of two
issues, not one, we have carefully identified conceptually distinct ways in
which the injection of partisanship into districting could be excessive. And
we have given reasons to prefer one of those conceptions—the ends-based,
counterfactual-baseline conception—over the others. This is the conception
of excessive partisanship that I will employ for the remainder of this Article;
when I speak of excessive partisanship without qualification, I will be
referring to a legislature’s effort to secure for the dominant party too much of
an electoral advantage relative to what it would have been likely to receive
had it not taken partisanship into account. Having settled on this conception,
at least provisionally, we nonetheless have some distance yet to travel. If the
problem of elaborating the constitutional principle is part of the
manageability problem writ large, we now arrive at the manageability
problem writ small.
I have observed that a clear majority of the Vieth Justices—and perhaps
all of them—endorse the following constitutional principle: excessive
partisanship in redistricting is unconstitutional.253 And I have offered a
coherent and sensible elaboration of this principle: it is unconstitutional for a
state to pursue too many more seats for a party than the party would likely
secure if the state did not take partisan considerations into account at all.
This is a proposed statement of constitutional meaning.
But meaning is not the same as doctrine.
Judge-announced
constitutional meaning is just that: the courts’ interpretation of what the
Constitution means or provides of its own force. Judge-crafted constitutional
doctrine is the rule of constitutional law to be applied by courts when
enforcing constitutional claims. As leading scholars are increasingly
emphasizing, these need not be the same thing.254 The next task, then, is to

253. See supra note 192.
254. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term—Foreword: The Document
and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 79 (2000) (observing that the Constitution “envisions that
in deciding cases arising under it, judges will offer interpretations of its meaning, . . . develop
mediating principles, and craft implementing frameworks enabling the document to work as incourt law”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term—Foreword: Implementing the
Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 57 (1997) (“Identifying the ‘meaning’ of the Constitution is
not the Court’s only function. A crucial mission of the Court is to implement the Constitution
successfully. In service of this mission, the Court often must craft doctrine that is driven by the
Constitution, but does not reflect the Constitution’s meaning precisely.”). Of course, Henry
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craft manageable doctrine to implement this meaning of excessive
partisanship.
Given the extraordinary unlikelihood, and perhaps impossibility, of ever
learning just what the legislature really would have done had it not
considered partisanship, any doctrine designed to implement this meaning of
excessive partisanship is likely to employ some sorts of proxies or heuristics.
That is, instead of directing courts to discover what the legislature would
have done had it not done what it did do, our doctrine should identify a
different target of inquiry that can serve as an adequate proxy for the
counterfactual baseline. Courts would then be directed to treat that proxy as
though it were the counterfactual baseline itself, for purposes of measuring
the extent of the partisanship employed.
That, indeed, is the strategy I will propose. But we can anticipate at
least one objection at the outset—namely, that the project of doctrinecreation is illegitimate.255
If judge-crafted constitutional doctrine is
something other than what the judiciary interprets the Constitution to mean,
we might wonder whether the Court has constitutional license to announce
doctrine in the first place, let alone to impose it upon political actors like
Congress or the States. What warrant do courts have to adjudicate
constitutional disputes by application of “doctrine” that, no matter how
“manageable,” is something other than constitutionally discoverable
“meaning”? Is this not to claim that the “Court has the power, not merely to
apply the Constitution but to expand it, imposing what it regards as useful
‘prophylactic’ restrictions upon Congress and the States”?256 And if it is,
then we confront a challenge. As Justice Scalia contended in his Dickerson
dissent, “That is an immense and frightening anti-democratic power, and it
does not exist.”257
I believe that Justice Scalia is wrong. Unfortunately, though, the
Dickerson majority did not favor him with a reply. So it will be useful to
address this objection up front, before we even embark on the project of
formulating doctrine to implement the constitutional meaning we have thus
far fleshed out. It will be helpful, in other words, to examine in rather more
detail the proper relationship between meaning and doctrine.258
Monaghan pressed essentially this point a generation ago. See Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme
Court, 1974 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975).
255. A second objection would be that no adequate proxy exists. This is not an objection that
could be met at the threshold. Better to treat this worry as an expression of understandable
skepticism and acknowledge that a burden will lie upon the proponent of any particular doctrine to
persuade us that the proxies she proposes are likely to serve the task adequately.
256. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 446 (2000) (Scalia J., dissenting).
257. Id.
258. That we may acknowledge a distinction between meaning and doctrine without
appreciating the nature of that distinction or its consequences exemplifies a common phenomenon
observed by H.L.A. Hart:
[I]t is characteristic not only of the use of legal concepts, but also of many concepts in
other disciplines and in ordinary life, that we may have adequate mastery of them for
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A. Operative Propositions and Decision Rules
Suppose that a majority of the Court were to agree with Justice
Stevens’s view of constitutional meaning: It is impermissible for a legislature
to pursue any partisan advantage in redistricting.259 I observed earlier that a
Justice who accepts this view must still craft a manageable standard.260 But
this is admittedly not self-evident. One might suppose that the Court could
simply announce that, henceforth, courts must evaluate claims of
unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering by reference to the constitutional
meaning alone: A challenged redistricting is an unconstitutional partisan
gerrymander if and only if the legislature did in fact make some line-drawing
decisions in order to realize partisan advantage. Under this approach, we
might say that the courts would employ only meaning, not doctrine.
Equivalently, we could say that this constitutional doctrine consists only of
(the Justices’ view of) constitutional meaning.
This conclusion runs into a difficulty, though. Courts called upon to
apply this doctrine (or this meaning, if you prefer) would lack unmediated
access to the fact of the matter. Not only would judges not know for sure
whether the legislature was motivated by partisanship, at least sometimes
they would know that they do not know. That is to say, they would be aware
of the need for some rule, even if implicit, for resolving this epistemic
uncertainty.
Now, the solution to this epistemic problem might seem clear. Courts
must administer the judge-interpreted constitutional meaning by something
like a more-likely-than-not standard of review. Hypothesizing, as we have,
that the Supreme Court has announced that it is unconstitutional for states to
pursue any partisan advantage when drawing electoral district lines, future
courts would be instructed to uphold a claim of unconstitutional partisan
gerrymandering if and only if persuaded that it is more likely than not that
the redistricters did in fact pursue partisan advantage to any degree. This
solution, it is true, does require that we revise the assumption made two
paragraphs earlier that constitutional doctrine could consist only of the
judiciary’s view of constitutional meaning. But the revision appears trivial.
We should say, instead, merely that the constitutional doctrine consists of
the purpose of their day-to-day use; and yet they may still require elucidation; for we
are puzzled when we try to understand our own conceptual apparatus. We may know
how to use these concepts, but we cannot say how we do this in ways which are
intelligible to others and indeed to ourselves. We know, and yet do not fully
understand . . . . This surely is the predicament which makes the philosophical
elucidation of concepts necessary . . . .
H.L.A. Hart, Analytical Jurisprudence in Mid-Twentieth Century: A Reply to Professor
Bodenheimer, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 953, 964 (1957).
259. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769, 1811–12 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also
supra text accompanying notes 126–30.
260. See supra text accompanying note 196.

2005]

Managing Gerrymandering

831

judge-interpreted constitutional meanings and the more-likely-than-not
standard of review.
That is not, however, quite the right lesson to draw. What the
inescapable fact of epistemic uncertainty really reveals is that constitutional
doctrine must consist of judge-interpreted constitutional meaning (like
Justice Stevens’s view that the Constitution prohibits any pursuit of partisan
advantage in redistricting) conjoined to some rule that directs courts how to
determine whether that meaning is complied with. In previous work, I have
proposed to call the former doctrinal component a “constitutional operative
proposition” and the latter a “constitutional decision rule.”261 That is to say,
“constitutional doctrine” is not reducible to “constitutional meaning”; it must
consist of (at the least) a constitutional operative proposition and a
constitutional decision rule. The more-likely-than-not standard is a possible
decision rule, indeed the most common one. We might fairly call it the
“default” or “standard” decision rule. But it is not the only possible decision
rule, and, in many contexts, it may not be the best.
One obvious alternative to the more-likely-than-not decision rule would
be to impose upon the challenger a heightened standard of proof. For example, were the Court to adopt Justice Stevens’s view of constitutional
meaning—if, in my jargon, they endorsed his preferred constitutional
operative proposition—they could administer it by means of a decision rule
that required excessive partisanship to be proved by clear and convincing
evidence.262 But a nonstandard decision rule could do more than merely
tweak the standard of proof. It could employ a rebuttable or conclusive
presumption. Tellingly, that is precisely Stevens’s proposed solution.
Having claimed that any pursuit of partisan advantage is unconstitutional, he
proposed to administer this operative proposition by means of an
underenforcing decision rule by which courts would be permitted to conclude
that there was some partisanship only “if the only possible explanation” for a
particular district’s shape was that partisan motivation “predominate[d].”263

261. Two notes about this vocabulary. First, the “constitutional operative proposition” is the
judicial understanding of constitutional meaning. It is not “constitutional meaning” simpliciter
because what the Constitution means may still be in dispute—outside the Court and within it—even
after a majority of the Court has announced what it takes the constitutional meaning to be. Second,
I use the term “constitutional decision rule” to signify the rule or procedure a court is instructed to
apply in order to “decide” whether the operative proposition is complied with. It is not the same as
a “rule of decision” as the Rules of Decision Act uses that term. For more detailed remarks about
this nomenclature, see Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, supra note 18, at 58 n.192.
262. Compare Erfer v. Commonwealth, 794 A.2d 325, 331 (Pa. 2002) (“A plaintiff bears a
heavy burden to prove it unconstitutional. ‘A statute will only be declared unconstitutional if it
clearly, palpably and plainly violates the constitution.’” (citation omitted)).
263. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769, 1809–12 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting). In claiming
that Justice Stevens’s approach nicely reflects the distinction between operative propositions and
decision rules, I do not mean to endorse his reliance on the notion of “dominant” and “predominant”
purposes. Whether employed in an operative proposition or a decision rule, this notion is not, I
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B. The Ubiquity of Nonstandard Decision Rules264
Judge-announced constitutional doctrines cannot be just the Court’s
view of constitutional meaning. They must additionally contain decision
rules. And while the more-likely-than-not decision rule is the most intuitive
and common, it is far from the only possibility. As Justice Stevens’s Vieth
dissent manifests, a given constitutional doctrine could consist of an
operative proposition conjoined to what we might term a “nonstandard”
decision rule—a decision rule that either requires that the operative
proposition be proved by some quantum of proof greater or less than morelikely-than-not or that incorporates rebuttable or conclusive presumptions.
Importantly, judicial resort to nonstandard decision rules is not merely a
logical possibility. There are good reasons why the Court might wish to craft
them. Whenever the operative proposition takes the form of a standard,
rather than a rule, or contains a predicate (like governmental purposes) that is
hard to discover, an intelligently chosen nonstandard decision rule can
increase the predictability and consistency of judicial review, reduce
litigation, and perhaps ameliorate interbranch tension.
In short, a
nonstandard decision rule can make judicial review much more
manageable.265 That is why Justice Stevens endorsed one in his Vieth
dissent. That is also why nonstandard decision rules turn out to be a common
feature of our constitutional landscape.
One of the clearest examples of the Court’s use of a nonstandard
decision rule is the Miranda doctrine. Miranda provides (roughly) that
statements made by a criminal defendant during custodial interrogation are
not admissible against him in the state’s case in chief unless the police had
previously supplied the suspect with a canonical set of warnings.266 The
legitimacy and status of this rule have befuddled academic commentators and
Supreme Court Justices for decades—as my earlier reference to Justice
Scalia’s Dickerson dissent exemplifies. As I have argued at length
elsewhere,267 however, this confusion can be cleared up once we analyze this
doctrine into its likely operative-proposition and decision-rule components.
The operative proposition states that the constitutional privilege against selfbelieve, coherent (if intended to capture any notion short of lexical primacy). See, e.g., Ely, supra
note 109, at 611–14. And the Vieth plurality was right to ridicule its use by Stevens. Or perhaps I
should say the plurality would have been right to ridicule that use had all members of the plurality
not endorsed precisely this test in the racial gerrymandering context. See Miller v. Johnson, 515
U.S. 900, 916 (1995). But see Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1000–03 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring
joined by Scalia, J.) (preferring a doctrine under which any use of race in redistricting would
provoke strict scrutiny).
264. With apologies to David Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV.
190 (1988).
265. But see supra note 198 (observing that at least some of these benefits accruing from a
nonstandard decision rule might not be best conceived in terms of improving doctrine’s
“manageability”).
266. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
267. See Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, supra note 18, at 114–66.
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incrimination268 prohibits courts from admitting into evidence out-of-court
statements by the accused that had been compelled from him by the police.
The decision rule directs that courts must conclusively presume that a
statement was compelled (in the sense that the operative proposition
contemplates) if it was elicited during custodial interrogation not preceded by
a specified set of warnings.
Now, to mention Miranda might seem against interest. Even if the case
does appear to employ a nonstandard decision rule, it is such an
exceptional—even notorious—example as perhaps to bolster, rather than to
allay, doubts about the legitimacy of decision rules of this form. This
criticism is misplaced. To be sure, the particular nonstandard decision rule
adopted in Miranda might have been poorly chosen. But the mere fact that
the Miranda Court crafted a conclusive presumption decision rule to
administer its view of Fifth Amendment meaning is not at all unusual.
Nonstandard decision rules are standard fare—employed by Justices with
widely varied judicial philosophies, across every field of constitutional
law.269
Consider, for example, another clause of the Fifth Amendment—the
Takings Clause. In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, the Court, per
Justice Scalia, held that a condition on the grant of a permit to exceed an
otherwise valid land use restriction constitutes an unconstitutional taking if
the condition does not serve the same governmental purpose as does the
restriction itself.270 But the Court did not adequately explain why the
Constitution forbids a state from trading some reduction in its ability to
realize the particular interest served by a given land use restriction for an
increased realization of another bona fide and legitimate state interest.
Nollan does make sense, however, if we suppose that the Court was
employing a nonstandard decision rule. Think of the permit condition (e.g.,
that the landowner would provide a public easement in exchange for a
desired development permit) not as a condition but as a command. In that
case, the state would be engaged in a taking for which it would owe just
compensation. The operative proposition that emerges from Nollan might be
that it is unconstitutional for a state to withhold a development right it would
otherwise provide for the purpose of pressuring the landowner on whom the
“permit condition” is imposed to waive her right to just compensation. That
is a plausible understanding of constitutional meaning. It is not, however,
easily managed by courts. How would a court determine whether the state
was acting in good faith when refusing the requested development permit
upon the landowner’s refusal to comply with the condition? The short
268. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself . . . .”).
269. Some of the following examples are drawn from Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules,
supra note 18, at 61–78, 108–13, where other illustrations are also provided.
270. 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
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answer is that a court will not have to, for the Nollan decision rule directs
courts to conclusively presume that a state would be withholding an offered
development right for the purpose of pressuring the landowner to waive her
Fifth Amendment right to compensation whenever the condition serves a
different governmental interest than the development ban to which the
condition is attached.
Or consider the Fourth Amendment right to be free from “unreasonable
searches and seizures.”271 This language seems to make unconstitutional any
search or seizure that, under all the circumstances, is not reasonable. Yet the
Court’s Fourth Amendment doctrine provides, inter alia, that a police officer
who has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed an
offense in his presence does not violate the Fourth Amendment by executing
a full custodial arrest no matter how trivial the criminal offense, how low the
risk of flight, and how high the cost to the arrested person and innocent third
parties.272 Furthermore, in order to ensure that the arrestee cannot use a
weapon to resist arrest and cannot conceal or destroy evidence, the arresting
officer may—again without violating the Fourth Amendment—search the
entire passenger compartment of the car in which the arrestee was found,
even if the arrestee is securely held beyond the reach of the car at the time of
the search.273 Doctrines such as these make little sense as elaborations of
what it truly means for a search or seizure to be constitutionally reasonable.
They might make sense, however, as decision rules that instruct courts to
conclusively presume searches and seizures to be reasonable under the
specified circumstances.
Equal protection jurisprudence is also profitably conceived as
comprised of nonstandard decision rules. Very possibly, the equal protection
operative proposition is best understood as a genuine balancing norm under
which the stringency of the justification constitutionally demanded of any
classification is always a function of the harm that the classification imposes.
Under this view, strict scrutiny would be a decision rule. And an
overenforcing one at that: The (concededly unusual, but surely imaginable)
sort of racial classification that produces only trivial individual and social
harm would satisfy the operative proposition so long as supported by
moderate justification, but would be adjudged to have violated the Equal
Protection Clause unless narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest.
The rational basis test is even more plainly a nonstandard decision rule.
It might well be that, outside of classifications that discriminate against
suspect and quasi-suspect classes or that infringe fundamental rights, state
action does not violate the equal protection operative proposition so long as
reasonably adopted to serve any genuine and legitimate state interest. The

271. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
272. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001).
273. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460–63 (1981).
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rational basis decision rule, however, directs courts, in effect, to conclude
that the challenged classification does in fact reasonably serve the state’s
ends “if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts” under which the
rational relationship would hold true.274
Nonstandard decision rules are not somehow limited to individual
rights. They are at home in federalism and separation of powers contexts,
too. It appears, for instance, that the Court will uphold an exercise of
Congress’s tax power275 against the claim that it was adopted for an
impermissible regulatory purpose so long as the tax does in fact produce
revenue.276 Is this the Court’s understanding of constitutional meaning? Not
likely. As Justice Jackson suggested, it makes more sense to understand
Congress’s constitutional taxing authority not to extend beyond the “rational
or good-faith revenue measure.”277 But, as Jackson also acknowledged, this
is not an easy rule for courts to administer. The tax decision rule,
accordingly, directs courts to conclusively presume that the challenged
measure is supported by a bona fide revenue-raising purpose (as the
operative proposition requires) so long as it does produce revenue.
Commerce Clause doctrine can be understood similarly. The doctrine
presently being developed by the Rehnquist Court is frequently and fairly
criticized on the ground (among others) that the question of whether the
intrastate activity being regulated has an economic or noneconomic character
cannot sensibly have the constitutional significance that Lopez and Morrison
attribute to it.278 But the aggregate effects test is similarly subject to criticism
on the ground (among others) that it confers upon Congress a de facto police
power. It could be, though, that both approaches embody decision rules
crafted to administer a similar operative proposition, perhaps one requiring
that Commerce Clause legislation have a genuine commercial purpose or
design. On this view, the Rehnquist Court has essentially decided to replace
a post-1937 decision rule that underenforced what limits on congressional
power the Constitution, properly interpreted, imposes with one that threatens
to overenforce such limits.279
Admittedly, the foregoing arguments are condensed and, in places,
telegraphic. But no elaboration could fully prove my case. I have been
reverse-engineering existing doctrines to show how they can be more satis274. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001) (quoting
Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993)).
275. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
276. See Kahriger v. United States, 345 U.S. 22, 28 (1953).
277. Id. at 35 (Jackson, J., concurring).
278. While stopping just short of declaring that intrastate activities must always be economic in
order to be regulable on a substantial-effects rationale, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613
(2000), the Court has nonetheless made clear that this is an extraordinarily important consideration.
See generally id. at 610–15.
279. This thought is developed at greater length in Berman, Guillen and Gullibility, supra note
204.
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factorily conceptualized as consisting of operative propositions administered
by nonstandard decision rules. It is therefore in the nature of the project that
one could always resist the proffered classifications.280 However, I am not
committed to the view that each of my illustrations is correct. I hope,
instead, to focus the reader’s attention on the forest, not the trees. Perhaps
the number and variety of plausible examples will persuade even those who
are not fully persuaded by any one example alone that nonstandard decision
rules are too essential a feature of our constitutional jurisprudence to be
easily dismissed as illegitimate.
If doubt nonetheless remains, election law jurisprudence should allay it.
Consider first the racial gerrymandering doctrine. Under Shaw and its
progeny, courts must apply strict scrutiny to the drawing of a challenged
district if persuaded that race was the “predominant factor motivating the
legislature’s decision to place a significant number of voters within or
without” that district.281 What in this doctrine is operative proposition, what
is decision rule? If, as Kennedy observes in Vieth, “[r]ace is an
impermissible classification,”282 full stop, then the Shaw rule must involve a
nonstandard decision rule: Conclusively presume that race has been
employed only if it appears to predominate.
The clincher, of course, is the one-person, one-vote rule itself. As
Justice O’Connor noted in Bandemer, the Baker Court ruled that “the reach
and meaning of the Equal Protection Clause” prohibited “arbitrary and
capricious discrimination against individual voters with respect to the weight
of their votes.”283 It follows that the one-person, one-vote rule, at least as
applied in congressional districting, is a decision rule that directs courts to
conclusively presume that the challenged scheme is arbitrary and capricious
from the mere fact that it minimally departs from perfect equipopulousness.
C. Decision Rules and Justiciability
The task left open after Part II was to craft manageable doctrine to
administer the understanding of excessive partisanship in redistricting that
that Part had put forth. This Part has argued that the logical structure of
constitutional adjudication yields a conceptual distinction between judicial
statements of interpreted constitutional meaning (“constitutional operative
280. This is famously true of any suggestion that a decision rule takes the form of a conclusive
presumption. The nominal doctrine, in each case, seems to say “X is unconstitutional.” I propose,
in contrast, that the doctrine is most felicitously analyzed as an operative proposition that says “Y is
unconstitutional” conjoined to a decision rule that directs “conclude Y if persuaded by a
preponderance that X.” Because an analysis of this sort is not provably correct unless and until the
authoritative doctrine maker endorses the recharacterization, it will always remain open to the
objection that the nominal doctrine is really just the operative proposition (“X is unconstitutional”)
and that the unstated decision rule directs “conclude X if persuaded of X by a preponderance.”
281. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995).
282. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769, 1793 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
283. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 149 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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propositions”) and directions regarding how courts should decide whether
those meanings are complied with (“constitutional decision rules”). It has
further sought to demonstrate that “nonstandard” decision rules that aim to
get at an operative proposition obliquely by employing proxies and
conclusive presumptions are pervasive. Armed with this understanding, we
can slightly restate where we have been and where we must go. Part II
suggested that the Court should recognize, as a constitutional operative
proposition, that redistricters may not pursue too much of an electoral
advantage for the dominant party relative to the electoral success that party
would likely have enjoyed had the redistricter not taken partisanship into
account. Part IV will explore how the Court can best craft decision rules to
administer that meaning.
But can a manageable decision rule satisfy the commands of
justiciability? Baker, after all, indicates that the absence of a “judicially
discoverable and manageable standard” spells a political question.284 Does
this mean that the entirety of the judicially announced doctrine—the decision
rule as well as the operative proposition—must be, in the language of the
Vieth plurality, “discernible in the Constitution”?285
Surely not. Were that the case, then courts would be running afoul of
the political question doctrine whenever they adjudicated constitutional
claims by application of nonstandard decision rules.286 All that can be
demanded, in the context of partisan gerrymandering as elsewhere, is a
judicially manageable test for sensibly administering the constitutionally
discernible standard.
That is, the operative proposition need be
discoverable;287 the decision rule need not be. Its relationship to the
constitutionally discernible standard is instrumental and pragmatic.
Accordingly, the plurality’s suggestions that the “judicially manageable
standard” must be (merely) “constitutionally based”288 or must bear a
“relation to constitutional harms”289 put things more aptly.
284. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
285. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1786 (plurality opinion).
286. This is not strictly so given that the manageability test operates prospectively only, not
retrospectively. See Levinson & Young, supra note 198, at 961–62. And the fact that a court has
ultimately decided to craft a nonstandard decision rule (a component of doctrine that I am assuming
is not itself “discernible in the Constitution”) does not entail that that court realized—at the moment
of assessing a claim’s justiciability—that deployment of a nonstandard decision rule would be
necessary. But the gist of the point remains: Even early on, the Court surely understood (or should
have understood) that it would not be able to administer such majestic constitutional generalities as
the Equal Protection Clause without crafting doctrine whose every jot and title could not possibly be
described as constitutionally discoverable.
287. The operative proposition must be “discoverable” only in the sense that it must arise from
application of generally (but not unanimously) accepted modalities of constitutional interpretation,
including, for example, structure and history. That is, the command of discoverability does not
entail clause-bound textualism.
288. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1784 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
289. Id. at 1786 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
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IV. Partisan Gerrymandering Doctrine
What shape, finally, should this instrumental decision rule take? How
should the Court administer the ends-based, conterfactual-baseline
understanding of excessive partisanship?290 Generally speaking, the Court
can proceed in at least two ways. It can adopt a single decision rule that
would govern all claims of excessive partisanship in gerrymandering, or it
could craft separate decision rules each of which is predicated on different
circumstances.291 In Sunstein’s terms, the first approach is wide, the latter is
narrow.292 To signify that these are not just points on a continuum, but two
qualitatively distinct alternatives, I will refer to them as wholesale and retail.
Subpart A proposes one wholesale decision rule designed to cover the
waterfront. Subpart B sketches the beginnings of a retail approach by
identifying three decision rules that courts might reasonably adopt to start
filling out the relevant space.
A. A Wholesale Decision Rule
A wholesale, or one-size-fits-all, option must successfully navigate the
three difficulties already noted: (1) the counterfactual problem of
ascertaining what the legislature would have done had it not considered
partisan advantage at all; (2) the prediction problem of estimating how many
seats the actual and counterfactual schemes can be expected to produce for
the relevant parties; and (3) the standard problem of deciding the magnitude
of the delta that separates permissible from excessive.
The standard problem is hardly a problem at all, so long as the
counterfactual and prediction problems are met. The Supreme Court
routinely concretizes into more-or-less arbitrary numbers the Justices’
intuitions about where, on a continuum, the proper cut-off point lies.293
Thus, for example, it has held that a population disparity between the most
and least populous state legislative districts of up to 10% presumptively

290. Issacharoff has proposed that the Court should “establish a prophylactic per se rule that
redistricting conducted by incumbent powers is constitutionally intolerable”—i.e., that redistricting
must be undertaken by nonpolitical commissions. Issacharoff, Political Cartels, supra note 245, at
601. In my terminology, he is proposing that our best understanding of constitutional meaning in
this area be administered by a nonstandard decision rule that employs a conclusive presumption.
Naturally, I approve of the basic strategy. His particular decision rule, however, is so overinclusive
(presumably, many legislative redistrictings stop short of embodying “excessive” partisanship) as to
have precious little chance of being adopted, or so it seems to me. Of course, this is a predictive
claim. It is agnostic regarding whether the harms produced by excessive partisanship in
redistricting are so grave as to justify such a substantial degree of prophylaxis.
291. Of course, the Supreme Court need not do the crafting itself. It could simply endorse
decision rules crafted by litigants or lower courts.
292. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT 241–43 (1999).
293. Cf. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 284–89 (1980) (discussing
Aquinas’s notion of “determinatio”).
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satisfies Reynolds.294 The prediction problem is also surmountable. Courts
already admit and evaluate expert submissions that, wielding tools developed
by political scientists, predict electoral outcomes from specified district lines.
Indeed, the lower court did it in Vieth.295
The counterfactual problem, in contrast, is a big one. It is foolish to
expect that plaintiffs could, by relying on whatever political evidence they
think is probative, establish to any reasonable degree of confidence what the
lines would likely have looked like had the legislature not considered
partisan advantage. We will have to proceed by proxy.
Imagine, for example, that we could generate all possible electoral
maps. If so, we could then rank them according to the expected partisan
outcome each would produce, and presume that the legislature would have
adopted a map that would have yielded the median outcome. That is, we
would treat the median outcome as though it were the counterfactual one. Of
course, this would be artificial: The true counterfactual map might have
produced electoral outcomes different from the median outcome of all
possible maps. But this is no objection once we acknowledge the
ineliminability of decision rules. Given epistemic uncertainty, even the
default (generally invisible) more-likely-than-not decision rule will produce
some erroneous outcomes. So too, necessarily, will nonstandard decision
rules. To conclusively treat the median outcome of all maps as though it
were the outcome of the counterfactual map would produce some errors that
favor the plaintiff, and some that favor the defendant—as would any decision
rule.
No, the inescapable inaccuracy of this approach does not doom it. What
dooms it is that it is impossible. Not only is the task of identifying all
possible electoral maps beyond the reach of today’s fastest supercomputers
(even if we restrict ourselves to the subset of all possible maps that satisfy
the criteria of contiguity and substantial population equality), current views
about the theoretical limits of computation suggest that a complete
enumeration will be forever unrealizable.296 It is precisely this impossibility

294. See Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 160–62 (1993); Brown v. Thompson, 462 U.S.
835, 842 (1983); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 745 (1973). But see Cox v. Larios, 124 S.
Ct. 2806, 2806 (2004) (holding that Georgia’s legislative reapportionment plan, although falling
under the 10% rule, violated the one-person, one-vote rule because of partisan political motivation).
For another example of an arbitrary number, see State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v.
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) (recognizing that “awards exceeding a single-digit ratio
between punitive to compensatory damages” rarely satisfy due process).
295. See Vieth v. Pennsylvania, 188 F. Supp. 2d 532, 546–47 (M.D. Pa. 2002) (considering
plaintiffs’ expert witness evidence that Pennsylvania’s new congressional districts would
“guarantee” that thirteen of nineteen elected representatives would be Republican). In claiming that
the prediction problem is surmountable, I do not mean to deny that the problem remains
challenging. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 11–13, Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769 (2004)
(No. 02-1580) (questioning the worth of expert testimony on issues of this sort).
296. See Micah Altman, Is Automation the Answer: The Computational Complexity of
Automated Redistricting, 23 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 81, 94–112 (1997).
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that leads one to a familiar idea in the gerrymandering literature: random
baselines. If we could generate some random subset of all possible electoral
maps297 and treat that random sample as representative of all possibly
adopted maps, then we could treat the median outcome from this random and
representative sample as the counterfactual baseline.
This is getting closer. Unfortunately, true randomness is also
impossible because the maps “randomly” generated are constrained by the
assumptions loaded into the algorithm, which are themselves the product of
design.298 The algorithm might assume, for example, that each district is
contiguous and that the scheme as a whole respects specified parameters for
average and differential district compactness, as well as other specified
parameters regarding the extent to which various types of political
subdivisions may be partitioned. Presumably it would also select only those
plans that comply with legal requirements supplied by, for example, the
Voting Rights Act and the Court’s apportionment and racial gerrymandering
jurisprudence. The question, then, is whether recognizing that the randombaseline approach is really only a pseudo-random-baseline approach is
necessarily fatal to it.
Let us explore why one might think so. There is no reason to believe
that the median outcome of all possible maps or of a truly random subset of
all possible maps will be systematically biased in any particular direction
from the outcome that the true (but undiscoverable) counterfactual baseline
map would have produced. Any divergence is equally likely to understate as
to overstate the number of seats that the party in control of the redistricting
would have realized had it not taken partisanship into account. Not so,
perhaps, the median outcome of all maps selected by a pseudo-random
algorithm. In particular, critics of the proposal to treat the median outcome
of the pseudo-random set of maps as the proxy for the counterfactual map are
likely to believe that the median outcome under such maps will understate
the outcome that the redistricting party would have achieved had no
partisanship infected its decisionmaking. It is not particularly important at
this time to evaluate whether a contention of this sort is likely to be sound.
My point is only that, because the critics of partisan gerrymandering are constantly battling uphill—first facing the extraordinarily inhospitable Bandemer
test, now facing the prospect that such claims will be held nonjusticiable—
the pseudo-random-baseline approach is more likely to be resisted on the
ground of its being too plaintiff-friendly, not too defendant-friendly.299
297. For just one example of an attempt along these lines, see Carmen Cirincione et al.,
Assessing South Carolina’s 1990s Congressional Districting, 19 POL. GEOGRAPHY 189 (2000).
298. For a demonstration, see Micah Altman & Michael McDonald, A Method of Revealed
Preferences for Evaluating Intent in Redistricting (unpublished manuscript, undated), at app. A.
For early insistence on this point, see Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 224, at 62.
299. Admittedly, it might also be resisted on the ground of being too Republican-friendly:
Insofar as compactness will inevitably feature in the randomizing algorithm, the outcomes at every
percentile are likely to systematically favor Republican interests given that Democratic voters tend
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But if this is so, one possible fix suggests itself. We could simply treat
as the counterfactual baseline, not the median outcome produced by the set of
pseudo-random maps, but some outcome at a specified distance from the
median. For example, we could allow the defendant to adopt as the counterfactual baseline any outcome within a standard deviation of the mean
outcome, or between, say, the 25th and 75th percentiles. So long as the
algorithm that produced the pseudo-random maps were reasonable (a
standard far short of ideal), some defendant-friendly revision of this sort
should correct against overly intrusive judicial intervention.
Putting all this together, we see the form that a decision rule could take.
The Supreme Court could direct courts to conclude that the legislature
pursued partisan advantage to an unconstitutional extent if the plaintiff
proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the expected partisan value of
the challenged scheme (to the party with majority control of the legislature)
is more than x% greater than the expected partisan value of the redistricting
scheme in the yth percentile of all maps generated in an appropriately
pseudo-random fashion.
Admittedly, this is more the framework for a decision rule than it is a
fully formed proposal. The Court, likely after considerable percolation in the
lower courts, would have to select values for x and y. Yet more challenging,
it would have to provide sufficient guidance regarding the acceptable
parameters of the pseudo-randomizing algorithm. There is no obviously
right answer on matters such as these. One solution would be to announce
some values for x and y as presumptions and authorize lower courts to pass
on pseudo-randomizing algorithms supplied by the parties themselves.300 In
this way, the decision rule could continue to take shape over time, commonlaw style.
An illustration, based on the Vieth litigation, might help illustrate the
proposed methodology. To start, I am assuming that the median electoral
outcome produced by all the maps that could be generated given a range of

to cluster in cities. However, it does not strike me as a persuasive argument against this approach
that reliance on pseudo-random baselines (as a proxy for the counterfactual baseline) might prove to
be more favorable to Republicans, and less favorable to Democrats, than some other possible
approaches to the problem, including nonjusticiability. But this might be mistaken.
300. Two thoughts come to mind, both very tentative. First, the algorithm ought not be
permitted to include any parameters for “communities of interest” because this notion is too
nebulous and serves as too ready a proxy for partisan affiliation. And although excluding
communities of interest from the pseudo-random districting schemes is a little artificial—some such
communities might matter to a nonpartisanly motivated legislature—the consequence of this
omission would be slight insofar as genuinely nonpartisan accommodation of these communities is
likely to cancel out, from the perspective of the partisan ledger. Second, although courts are in no
position to write algorithms themselves, they could find that parties present them with very
palatable alternatives if courts employ baseball-style arbitration as the means for selecting from
among the universe of plausible candidates. This might be especially true if courts turn a skeptical
eye to aspects of a party’s proposal that differ from what the party has advanced in litigation in
other states.
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plausible map-drawing assumptions is a fair proxy for the electoral outcome
that would have obtained under the map that the legislature would have
enacted had it not considered partisanship at all, i.e., the counterfactual map.
For example, if the median expected electoral outcome in Pennsylvania,
under all the maps that could have been drawn consistent with specified linedrawing assumptions would have given Republicans 9.9 out of the state’s 19
seats,301 then it seems reasonable to assume that the map that would have
been drawn had partisanship not entered into the redistricting calculus would
have resulted in the election of 9.9 Republicans. By calling this a reasonable
assumption, I mean that we lack compelling reason to accept either of the
two competing assumptions that the counterfactual map would likely have
produced for the Republicans (a) more than 9.9 seats or (b) less than 9.9
seats. Consequently, had the Court interpreted the Constitution to provide
that redistricters may take no account of partisan advantage, then it might
sensibly adopt a decision rule under which any map that would have likely
yielded for the Republicans more than 9.9 expected seats would be presumed
(or adjudged) to be unconstitutional.
But the Court has not interpreted the Constitution to proscribe all
pursuit of partisan advantage. Instead, it has declared that the Constitution
forbids only excessive pursuit of partisan advantage, some such partisan
motivation being constitutionally permissible. This is the reason for
introducing x: even if the expected electoral outcome under the
counterfactual map would have been 9.9 Republican seats, a Republicandominated legislature is constitutionally entitled to adopt a map that can be
expected to yield something more than 9.9 seats. If x is, say, 10% of the
party’s otherwise expected seats, then the decision rule might direct courts to
adjudge any plan adopted by the Republican-controlled Pennsylvania
legislature to reflect unconstitutionally excessive partisanship if it is expected
to yield more than 10.89 Republican seats.
Variable y is designed to give the state one additional layer of
protection. I have said above that if the pseudo-randomizing formula were
good, then the median outcome supplies the single most reasonable assumption for the counterfactual map; no single other assumption is more
reasonable. But, invariably, the formula will be contested by both sides. The
state might argue, for example, that even had it not considered partisanship at
all, it would have drawn district lines with far more concern for preserving
the integrity of subdivisions, and concomitantly less concern for average
district compactness, than the algorithm reflects. As a result, the median
Republican outcome understates the success that the Republican Party could

301. That application of this decision rule introduces fractional representatives should not be
treated as a problem. Sophisticated models for predicting electoral delegations will always generate
fractional results. A moment’s reflection reveals why this should be: Although districts with 55%
and 85% Republican majorities are both likely to produce Republican office holders, they are not
equally likely to do so.
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have expected under the counterfactual map. Plaintiffs would argue, in
essence, the opposite—say, that the formula does not give sufficient weight
to district compactness, or mistakenly weights average district compactness
more heavily than minimizing the distance between the most and least
compact districts, or wrongly employs a dispersion measure of compactness
when it should have employed a perimeter measure. Whatever the particular
arguments, they would be designed to establish, of course, that the median
Republican outcome under the pseudo-randomly generated maps overstates
what the Republicans could have expected to achieve under the
counterfactual map.
There are sound reasons, grounded in concern for the separation of
powers, to consider an erroneous judicial invalidation of a challenged scheme
to be a weightier social harm than an erroneous judicial validation. Courts
can partially accommodate this fact by pegging the counterfactual electoral
baseline (the expected electoral outcome under the map that the legislature
would have enacted had it not considered partisan advantage) not at the
median of all maps produced pseudo-randomly, but at some distance y from
the median—say, a quartile. Suppose now that, although the median
electoral outcome of the pseudo-random assortment of maps would yield 9.9
Republicans, the outcome in the 75th percentile of maps would have been
expected to produce 10.7 Republican victories. Because the in party is
constitutionally permitted to strive to increase its electoral success by up to
10% (we are assuming), it follows that a redistricting scheme adopted by the
Pennsylvania Republicans could be presumed to be infected by excessive
partisanship were it expected to yield more than 11.77 Republican
victories.302
Lest I be read as overselling a decision rule of this form, let me clearly
acknowledge some of its deficits. It is complex and inelegant. Particulars of
the pseudo-randomizing algorithms will always be contestable and contested.
At the level of detail represented by the variables x and y, it is inescapably
arbitrary. But it is a conceptually coherent solution to the problem and, I
believe, feasible. Can any decisive objections be leveled against it? Twenty

302. To make clear, although x and y are both intended to offer state defendants protection
against overly intrusive judicial intervention, they do so in different ways. Variable x reflects the
fact that, according to the Court, the line of constitutionality runs between excessive and permissible
degrees of partisanship, not between some partisanship and none; variable y modifies an admittedly
imperfect decision rule in a defendant-friendly direction. It is tempting, but wrong, to suppose that
we could achieve the same result more simply by eliminating y and increasing x. The cash value of
moving from the median to the yth percentile for purposes of fixing the supposed counterfactual
baseline will depend upon the demographic and geographic characteristics of the state in question.
In some states, plausible nonpartisan districting criteria might produce a very wide range of
electoral outcomes. In other states, the electoral outcomes that could be expected under plausible
nonpartisan criteria would be much more narrowly circumscribed. It seems appropriate that, all else
being equal, courts should accept as constitutional a more skewed electoral outcome under the
former conditions than under the latter. This can be accomplished by incorporating factors x and y
into the decision rule; it cannot be accomplished by using only the single variable x.
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years ago, for example, Richard Niemi lodged the following two objections
against reliance on pseudo-random baselines:303 First, it is “difficult to find a
constitutional basis for requiring” their use. Second,
to require use of this type of baseline would entail heavy reliance on
proportional representation. Even though such a baseline would not
force the proportion of seats and votes to be equal, it would impose a
statistical test to see if the seats to votes ratio was “too far” from what
would occur naturally.304
Do these criticisms tell against my proposed decision rule too?
They don’t. The second objection simply has no bearing. The analysis
I propose entails no reliance on proportional representation. There is no need
to consider seat-to-vote ratios at all.
Niemi’s first objection is slightly different. He is right that it is difficult
to understand why a departure from a baseline of what the partisan
distribution of seats would be under a set of districting schemes identified
pseudo-randomly renders a particular plan unconstitutional. Put in my terms,
it is hard to see why the pseudo-random-district baseline would function as
any part of the constitutional operative proposition. But, of course, that is
not my claim. If a plan is unconstitutional it is because the expected electoral
outcome departs too far from the expected electoral outcome under the
counterfactual plan.
The constitutionally relevant baseline is the
counterfactual one. We would consider expected electoral outcomes under a
pseudo-random assortment of redistricting plans only as a proxy for the
expected outcome under the plan that the legislature would have adopted had
it not pursued partisan advantage. I do not contend—indeed, I deny—that
reference to any sort of pseudo-random baseline is “constitutionally
required.”
B. Some Retail Decision Rules
Although I believe that a wholesale decision rule roughly of the form
just outlined holds promise, there is no denying that it is an ambitious
solution. A more modest alternative approach, still consistent with the
arguments developed in Parts II and III of this Article, would be for courts to
develop decision rules more closely tailored to the facts of the cases in which
claims of unconstitutionally partisan gerrymandering arise. This strategy
would produce some number of decision rules all predicated on different
circumstances: Under circumstances C1, conclude that the legislature violated
the ban on unconstitutionally excessive partisanship in redistricting if M;
under circumstances C2, conclude that the legislature violated the ban on
unconstitutionally excessive partisanship in redistricting if N; et cetera.
303. Although Niemi nominally focused on “random district” baselines, his criticisms
necessarily apply to pseudo-random variants. Niemi, supra note 224, at 207.
304. Id. at 208.
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Because it involves a mid-decade gerrymander, the Texas case, Session
v. Perry,305 provides a textbook example of what one sensible retail decision
rule would look like. Accordingly, this final section concentrates on a
decision rule tailored to the context of mid-decade redistricting. But even a
reader who finds such a decision rule justifiable and attractive might
nonetheless worry that it is more likely to exhaust than to illustrate the
universe of sensible and manageable retail decision rules. As a response to
understandable skepticism of this sort, this subpart concludes by offering two
brief additional examples of possible retail decision rules designed to
administer the constitutional ban on excessive partisanship in redistricting.
The basic thrust here is not to insist that any one of these proposed retail
decision rules is optimal. More modestly, it is to offer some grounds to be
optimistic that the general strategy I recommend—embracing my proposed
understanding of excessive partisanship, and then constructing instrumental
decision rules—is likely to prove fruitful when litigants and lower courts are
enlisted into the effort.
1. Mid-decade Redestricting.—One consequence of the Court’s rule
that electoral districts be nearly equipopulous is to require legislatures to
redraw state districts after each decennial census. Perhaps because the
process is contentious, costly, and time-consuming, however, states have not
traditionally redistricted with any greater frequency than that. In 2003,
though, Texas did.306 Prodded by House majority leader Tom DeLay, the
Texas Legislature, under unified Republican control, took up the issue of
congressional redistricting even though a lawful map was already in place.
Resisting this unprecedented move, a group of Democratic members of the
Texas House fled to Oklahoma to break the quorum and prevent the
redistricting legislation from being considered that session. In response,
Republican Governor Rick Perry called the legislature into special session
for the sole purpose of considering redistricting. This time, the plan hit a
snag in the Texas Senate, as 11 of the 31 senators announced that they
opposed redistricting. Because long-standing tradition in the senate had
required that a measure be supported by two-thirds of the membership before
the full senate will consider it, this opposition doomed the legislation.
Undeterred, the Republican lieutenant governor announced that he
would not recognize the two-thirds rule and called a second special session
on congressional redistricting. This session too ended in failure when the 11
senators fled to New Mexico, depriving the Senate of a quorum. Later, when
one of their number returned to Texas, Governor Perry called a third special

305. 298 F. Supp. 2d 451 (E.D. Tex. 2004).
306. Texas was not alone. The Republican-controlled Colorado legislature did the same.
Interpreting the Colorado state constitution to prohibit mid-decade congressional redistricting,
however, the Colorado Supreme Court struck it down on state-law grounds. See People ex rel.
Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P.3d 1221, 1237–40 (Colo. 2003).
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session at which the Republican plan—designed to give Republicans a 22–10
edge in the state’s congressional delegation—passed on a nearly perfect
party-line vote.307
Although the Texas redistricting effort provided more drama than its
Pennsylvania cousin, the output was in many respects similar. Like the
Pennsylvania gerrymander, the Texas plan reflects only moderate regard for
compactness and the integrity of political subdivisions, and it also pairs many
Democratic incumbents with each other or with Republican incumbents in
heavily Republican districts. More significantly, the partisan motivation
was, again, both extreme and avowed. As State Representative Phil King,
one of the House leaders of the redistricting battle, admitted, the Republican
leadership’s goal was to “get as many seats as we could.”308 Or, as a
Republican staffer put it, the plan was designed to “assure that Republicans
keep the house [of Representatives] no matter the national mood.”309
In one conspicuous respect, however, the Texas gerrymander differs
from the Pennsylvania gerrymander upheld in Vieth: The Pennsylvania
legislature was constitutionally obligated to redistrict as a result of the 2000
census. In contrast, when the Texas legislature got started, a constitutionally
valid districting plan based on 2000 census data was already in place, having
been adopted by judicial order in 2001.310 The Texas scheme, but not the
Pennsylvania one, was adopted mid-decade to replace a legally valid scheme.
It was a redistricting of choice, not necessity.
For at least two reasons, the mid-decade, or off-cycle, character of the
Texas gerrymander represents a distinction with a difference.311 First, the

307. The Texas gerrymander received considerable attention in the media. The foregoing facts
have been pulled from a collection of sources. For a general overview of the events surrounding the
Texas gerrymander, see R.G. Ratcliffe et al., 78th Texas Legislature; On the lam in Oklahoma;
Fugitive Democrats, GOP Point Fingers across Red River; House will Stay Shut, Rebels Vow,
HOUS. CHRON., May 14, 2003, at A1; Bennett Roth & Rachel Graves, Special Session, Texas
Legislature; DeLay: Senators Violating Constitution; Says 11 Who Fled to Derail Redistricting
‘Don’t Understand Honor’, HOUS. CHRON., Aug. 18, 2003, at A13. For a discussion of the role of
House majority leader Tom DeLay, see LOU DUBOSE & JAN REID, THE HAMMER: TOM DELAY,
GOD, MONEY, AND THE RISE OF THE REPUBLICAN CONGRESS 199 (2004). As further evidence of
the redistricting’s partisan influence, Texas Republicans gained six congressional seats in the
November 2004 election. See Chuck Lindell, A New Map, A New Rise to Power, AUSTIN
AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Nov. 4, 2004, at A1 (reporting that redistricting “not only cost Texas
Democrats six congressional seats” but also “the combined loss of 102 years of House experience as
members retired, switched parties or lost elections”).
308. Jurisdictional Statement at 13 n.25, Jackson v. Perry, 2004 WL 792334 (2004) (No. 031391).
309. Id. at 12.
310. Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 458 (E.D. Tex. 2004) (citing Balderas v. Texas, No.
6:01-CV-158, slip op. (E.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 2002), aff’d mem., Balderas v. Texas, 536 U.S. 919
(2002)); see also Session, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 528 (Ward, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (describing the previous, court-ordered plan as “a plan that is beyond dispute a legal one”).
311. Plaintiffs have challenged the Texas scheme on a variety of additional grounds, including
racial gerrymandering and violations of the Voting Rights Act. See Session, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 457.
In examining only the partisan gerrymandering issues, I do not intend to express any view on the

2005]

Managing Gerrymandering

847

possibility of off-cycle redistricting permits legislatures to pursue much more
extreme partisan gerrymanders. Second, the fact of an off-cycle redistricting
constitutes powerful evidence that the legislature was in fact motivated to
pursue extreme partisan goals.312
To appreciate the first point, one need only attend, ironically, to the
reasons Justice O’Connor gave in Bandemer for holding claims of partisan
gerrymandering nonjusticiable. Relying on the work of political scientist
Bruce Cain, O’Connor based her position in part on the assertion that “there
is good reason to think that political gerrymandering is a self-limiting
enterprise.”313 In a nutshell, Cain’s (and O’Connor’s) argument goes as
follows: The extremity of a gerrymander is a function of the extent to which
the controlling party can make its own districts efficient (involving very
small margins of victory) and the opposing party’s districts inefficient (very
large margins of victory). But the more efficient the district, the bigger the
risk. Because the party itself and the individual incumbents will be
somewhat risk averse, they will draw districts to produce larger cushions
than rigorous pursuit of partisan advantage would seem to dictate.
This is persuasive as far as it goes. But the efficiency that a party or an
incumbent will tolerate is not only a function of its or her degree of risk
aversion, it is also a function of the time horizon. The riskiness of any given
district is inversely proportional to the expected margin of victory in the next
election and directly proportional to the expected number of elections before
the next redistricting—as Cain’s own analysis makes clear.314 Therefore,
O’Connor’s argument that political gerrymandering is likely to be selflimiting depends heavily on the assumption that redistricting will occur only
once per decade.315 Significantly, if a party’s control of the state legislature
possible validity of any other sorts of claims. Although the three-judge district court upheld the
scheme against all of these challenges, and although, presumably, only the partisan gerrymandering
issue is alive on remand, any of the claims could potentially serve as the basis for a successful
subsequent appeal to the Supreme Court.
312. If the Court wanted to eliminate all partisan gerrymanders, not only the “excessively
partisan” variety, it would have an additional reason to disfavor off-cycle redistricting. If
legislatures are permitted to redistrict whenever they want, they can choose to do so when the state
government is fully in the hands of a single party. But permitting redistricting to occur only at
specified times (for instance, after each decennial census is reported) increases the chance that the
legislature to whom the obligation falls will be unable to advance strictly partisan goals. See Cox,
supra note 248, at 800–02. Because a solid majority of the Court has made clear that it does not
view all partisan motivation as unconstitutional, however, I do not rely on this consideration.
313. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 152 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing BRUCE
CAIN, THE REAPPORTIONMENT PUZZLE 151–59 (1984)).
314. See, e.g., CAIN, supra note 313, at 152 (explaining that a majority party’s willingness to
gerrymander depends on its “estimate of long-range political and demographic trends”); id. at 156
(referring to one study that “suggests that whatever partisan advantage the controlling party gets
from reapportionment tends to erode quickly over time with changes in the composition of districts”
and concluding that “partisan gerrymandering is technically difficult because time and geography
can undo the reapportioner’s craft”).
315. Incidentally, Justice O’Connor’s conclusion is suspect for another reason too. The
severity of a gerrymander is a function not only of the efficiency that the controlling party will
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is secure, the mere possibility of off-cycle redistricting can be enough to
embolden gerrymanders more extreme than would otherwise occur: The
party can accept narrower expected margins of victory in its “own” districts
than it otherwise would so long as it can be confident that off-cycle redistricting will be possible in the event that those highly efficient districts
threaten to become too efficient—i.e., too risky. So a regime that permits
off-cycle redistricting is likely to produce more egregious gerrymanders even
when the option is not exercised.
And what if that option is exercised? As suggested earlier, redistricting
is, across a number of dimensions, a costly enterprise. This is well illustrated
by the Texas experience, which consumed, among other things, three special
sessions, scores of hearings across the state, one long-standing state senate
rule, and, by most accounts, much of whatever amity had existed between the
two parties in Texas. It is elementary that the more costly an optional
activity, the greater must be the expected payoff before a rational actor will
engage in it. Because the most obvious types of payoff that redistricters
expect from redistricting are incumbency protection and partisan advantage,
we can expect—courts can expect—that the partisan advantage pursued in an
off-cycle redistricting is likely to be substantial, not modest.
These two reasons, in combination, strongly recommend one retail
decision rule that courts can adopt to administer the Vieth-recognized
constitutional ban on excessive partisanship in redistricting: Courts should
conclude that mid-decade redistrictings undertaken by a single-partycontrolled state government are motivated by excessive partisanship—hence
are unconstitutional—unless narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
interest.316 The three-judge district court to which the Supreme Court
tolerate (which is itself a function of the time between redistrictings), but also of the extent to which
that party is willing to flout traditional districting criteria. The more noncompactness that
mapmakers are willing to tolerate, the bigger the cushion it can provide itself to ameliorate risk. It
is worth noting, therefore, that Cain’s relatively sanguine assessment that partisan gerrymandering
can be kept within acceptable bounds without judicial intervention seems to rest on the assumption
that redistricters won’t “resort[] to wildly noncompact shapes.” Id. at 150.
316. Just as a single constitutional operative proposition (i.e., a court’s understanding of
constitutional meaning) could be successfully administered by a variety of decision rules, a single
decision rule could be well suited to administer more than one operative proposition. I have
proposed the decision rule in the text as a means to implement what we might call the Vieth
operative proposition—a constitutional ban on excessive partisanship in redistricting, as this Article
fleshes out what “excessive partisanship” means. As it happens, however, this same decision rule,
or something very much like it, might constitute an appropriate means to implement the Baker
operative proposition that bars “arbitrary and capricious discrimination against individual voters
with respect to the weight of their votes.” See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
When adjudicating malapportionment challenges, courts have (understandably) indulged the
legal fiction that a state’s population remains constant until the census reveals otherwise. See, e.g.,
Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 488 n.2 (2003). No matter how obvious it might be to
demographers that, because of differential rates of migration, mortality, or fertility, the population
of one district is likely to grow faster or slower than in another, courts assume that districts
equipopulous at the start of a districting cycle remain equipopulous throughout the cycle. This
makes sense when the districts are created at the cycle’s start. But to respect this fiction even when
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remanded the Texas litigation can announce this rule.317 I believe that it
should.
Let me consider three objections. Critics might object, first, that middecade redistricting is constitutionally permissible.318 And so it is. This is
where my approach—which depends heavily on an explicit and reasonably
precise distinction between judge-interpreted constitutional meaning and the
doctrinal rules crafted to implement that meaning—differs from those
advanced by the Session plaintiffs319 and by other academic commentators.320
The instant question is whether the incidence of excessive partisanship in
mid-decade redistrictings is likely to be sufficiently high that it becomes
reasonable to adopt a decision rule that directs courts to presume excessive
partisanship from mid-decade redistricting. I have already provided reasons
to believe that the answer to that question is yes, and it is an answer that the
empirical evidence supports. The two modern instances of mid-decade
congressional redistricting—Texas and Colorado—are widely understood as
textbook examples of extreme partisanship.
districts are created mid-cycle is an invitation to abuse. Consequently, courts might reasonably
adopt a decision rule that requires judges to presume that a mid-decade redistricting scheme
constitutes an unconstitutional malapportionment unless, say, the state can meet the compelling
interest test or can establish that the challenged plan comports, at the time of its introduction, with
the demands of at least rough equipopulousness. (I am indebted to Steve Bickerstaff and Renea
Hicks for independently pressing this argument upon me.) Indeed, an argument broadly consistent
with this view (though not clearly distinguishing between operative propositions and decision rules,
or between meaning and doctrine) has been urged upon the three-judge court in Session on remand.
See Brief of University Professors Concerned about Equal Representation for Equal Numbers of
People as Amicus Curiae, Session v. Perry (E.D. Tex. 2005) (No. 2:03-CV-354) [hereinafter Brief
of University Professors as Amicus Curiae].
317. The Texas gerrymander involves congressional redistricting. It is worth noting that a rule
of this sort is, if anything, even more obviously appropriate in cases of mid-decade redrawing of
electoral districts for state legislatures. As Justice Breyer argues in his Vieth dissent,
gerrymandering is most profoundly antithetical to democratic principles when it serves to entrench a
minority party in power for an extended period of time. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769,
1825 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting). That can happen if a state legislature becomes controlled by a
party with minority electoral support and then redraws the electoral districts in its favor. But if
redistricting occurs only once a decade, then the minority party that seeks to entrench itself must
craft new electoral lines that give it a majority not only in the immediately following election, but in
the election eight years later that will produce the legislature that will next redistrict. The
demographic changes that naturally occur over the course of a decade might make entrenchment of
this sort difficult. We might say that if partisan gerrymandering stacks the electoral deck against the
disfavored party, demographic changes somewhat reshuffle that deck before it can be stacked again.
Not so if the minority party can redistrict every few years. Simply put, frequent and partisan
redistricting is all the more dangerous when what is at stake includes the power to redistrict itself.
Off-cycle partisan gerrymandering of state electoral districts cannot be tolerated by anyone who
worries about minority entrenchment.
318. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 594 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
319. Jurisdictional Statement, supra note 308, at 11 (arguing that the Court should hold that the
Constitution bars “congressional redistricting motivated solely by partisanship” when the “middecade replacement of a perfectly lawful plan has nothing to do with population equality”).
320. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 248, at 777–78 (advancing a procedural rule that would prohibit
states from redistricting outside the decennial census cycle).
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To be sure, a decision rule of this sort might be modestly overinclusive:
Some mid-decade redistrictings might not issue from excessive partisan
motivation. But a modest degree of overbreadth does not doom an otherwise
manageable standard. Indeed, that is one important lesson that the distinction
between operative propositions and decision rules is designed to teach.
Moreover, the degree of likely overbreadth ought not to be overstated. Here,
as elsewhere, strict scrutiny need not be fatal in fact. As the Texas litigation
itself evidences, states might contend that the mid-decade redistricting was
justified to cure a grossly partisan plan adopted by the previous legislature.321
Perhaps a “remedial” objective of this sort ought to qualify as a compelling
state interest. If so, the challenged mid-decade plan should be upheld so long
as it is narrowly tailored to cure the prior partisan offense, not to replace one
excessively partisan plan with its mirror image.
A second and related objection takes the form of a distinction: Even if a
decision rule of the sort I propose might be appropriately applied to off-cycle
redistrictings adopted to replace a valid plan that had itself been adopted in
the democratically preferred way—by the legislature or by a districting
commission—it should not apply where, as in Texas, the mid-decade redistricting was enacted to replace a court-ordered plan. This is not a wholly
implausible position. But it is not ultimately persuasive.
It is true that courts have often assumed that their plans are only stopgap
measures that legislatures are constitutionally free to replace. Nothing I have
said is to the contrary. But, again, the important question is not whether it is
constitutionally permissible to redistrict mid-decade, whether replacing a
court-ordered plan or even a legislatively adopted one. For the answer to that
question is clear: it is permissible, but only so long as the mid-decade redistricting does not exhibit excessive partisanship (or any other constitutional
vice). The appropriate question, rather, is whether a single-party controlled
legislature that exercises its option to replace a court-ordered plan with one
of its own devising is likely to be motivated by excessive partisanship. And,
in answering that question, it is surely relevant that states rarely if ever
accept the invitation to replace a court-drawn plan when permitted to do
so.322 When the legislature is under bipartisan control, the benefits of
redistricting when not required are rarely thought to outweigh the costs.
More pointedly, to except from the decision rule cases where the state
redistricts mid-decade to replace a court-ordered plan that was adopted

321. See Motion to Affirm at 5, Jackson v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451 (E.D. Tex 2004) (No.
03-1391) (characterizing the 2003 redistricting as an effort to “remov[e] the dead-hand effect of the
1991 Democratic gerrymander”).
322. See Brief of University Professors as Amicus Curiae, supra note 316, at 9 n.10 (reviewing
all of the cases cited in Session as support for the proposition that courts generally assume that the
plans they adopt can be changed or replaced by subsequent legislative action and concluding that,
“[a]lthough in some instances the state legislature enacted laws codifying a court’s plans, it does not
appear that in any of the cases the state legislature enacted a substantively new redistricting plan”).
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because the state had failed to act would encourage precisely the evil we are
seeking to prevent. If a party lacked control of the state government, but
anticipated gaining control in the next election, they could block passage of
any redistricting scheme, thereby parking the issue in the courts until they
could successfully work an extreme partisan gerrymander. Indeed, some
expert observers contend that is exactly what the Texas Republicans did. In
2001, Republicans controlled the Texas State Senate and the Governorship,
while Democrats clung to a thin majority in the State House. Yet, instead of
compromising with their Democratic colleagues, these commentators claim,
the Republicans made a tactical decision to let the redistricting go to federal
court just so they could replace whatever plan the judges adopted with an
extreme partisan gerrymander as soon as the 2002 state elections turned the
house over to Republican control.323
To protect against such tactics, courts should apply the mid-decade
decision rule proposed above even when the challenged redistricting replaces
a court-ordered plan—at least when the court-ordered plan was a response to
the state’s failure, as in Texas, to enact any redistricting scheme at all. I
leave open the possibility that the decision rule should not be applied when a
mid-decade plan adopted by a single-party controlled government replaces a
judicially drawn map that had been ordered as a remedy following judicial
invalidation of a timely enacted legislative scheme. How to deal with that
small corner of the possible universe of cases raises an important question,
but not one that must be resolved in order to dispose of the Texas case.
If the second objection urges that the off-cycle decision rule is
overbroad, a third objection, or combination of objections, might react to the
rule’s admitted underinclusiveness—the fact that it has no application to
cases of on-cycle redistricting. I take it that the underinclusiveness of this
rule could not be a decisive objection against it if the effective upshot were
that claims of unconstitutionally partisan on-cycle redistricting were
nonjusticiable. Surely this is an objection that members of the Vieth
plurality, and its defenders, would be singularly ill-situated to advance. To
paraphrase Justice Scalia from a dissimilar context, if it is constitutionally
permissible for the Court not to enforce constitutional meaning at all, surely
it is constitutionally permissible for the Court to enforce constitutional
meaning a little.324 In short, those who would hold claims that a legislature

323. As John Alford, a Rice political scientist and one-time expert witness for Governor Perry,
explained, “Republicans used the court-drawn plan as a place to park redistricting until they could
address the issue when they were in control of the House and obviously better off in the Senate.”
David M. Halbfinger, Across U.S., Redistricting as a Never-Ending Battle, N.Y. TIMES, July 1,
2003, at A1 (quoting Professor Alford).
324. “If it is constitutionally permissible for a State to make homosexual conduct criminal,
surely it is constitutionally permissible for a State to enact other laws merely disfavoring
homosexual conduct.” Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 641 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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has enacted an unconstitutionally excessive partisan gerrymander
nonjusticiable lack standing to complain if justiciability is preserved but the
claims are adjudicated by means of an underenforcing decision rule.325
A more plausible worry, I suppose, arises if the negative implication of
this off-cycle decision rule is not that on-cycle redistricting is nonjusticiable.
If, instead, claims challenging “ordinary” redistricting should be adjudicated
under the default (and essentially invisible) more-likely-than-not standard,
then the familiar cries about the unmanageability of the task again rise to the
surface. But there is a third possibility: This one decision rule that, by its
terms, applies only to off-cycle redistricting ought to be supplemented by one
or more decision rules that apply in the more usual context of on-cycle redistricting. The following two examples are intended to suggest that such rules
can be crafted, and therefore that the underinclusiveness of this one decision
rule ought not to prevent its adoption.
2. Departures from a Bipartisan Status Quo.—I have argued that the
best understanding of what it means for a state to exhibit excessive
partisanship in redistricting depends upon the notion of a counterfactual
baseline: The electoral success the party in control can be expected to have
realized under the scheme it would have adopted had it not considered
partisan outcomes at all. I have also acknowledged that the difficulty in
identifying this counterfactual baseline constitutes one problem—the biggest
problem—for operationalizing this understanding. It is therefore tempting to
somehow generate this counterfactual baseline from the status quo ante.
As the Texas litigation exemplifies, however, state defendants are likely
to object to this maneuver on the grounds that the status quo itself is the
product of partisan manipulation by the previous party in power.326 This can
be a fair objection. But only when the opposing party effectively controlled
redistricting the last time around. This suggests another retail decision rule:
Whenever a redistricting scheme was adopted under conditions of singleparty control to replace a plan that was not (i.e., if the prior scheme had been
adopted by a court, a nonpartisan commission, or a legislature under
conditions of divided government), courts should presume327 that the

325. Of course, the putative greater does not always include the lesser. And it would be
entirely consistent with his judicial philosophy were Justice Scalia to resist this claimed lesser
(judicial deployment of an underenforcing decision rule) in favor of the claimed greater (a total
refusal to adjudicate claims of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering) if the underenforcing
decision rule here proposed relied on the sort of judicial subjectivity that Scalia denounces. But it
doesn’t. The predicate for application of the rule—that the redistricting was adopted mid-decade
under conditions of single-party control—can be determined almost mechanically. And the
compelling interest test, albeit somewhat subjective, is a doctrinal staple.
326. See supra note 321.
327. I put aside how, if at all, the presumption could be overcome, except to acknowledge that
to construe the presumption as a mere burden-shifting mechanism is not likely to allay the Court’s
manageability concerns. It might be appropriate to require states to produce clear and convincing
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challenged plan reflects excessive partisanship if it can be expected to net for
the dominant party a proportion of the seats in the next election that exceeds
by more than x% (say, for illustration, 20%) the proportion of the seats it had
averaged under the prior plan.
3. Disparate Shacking.—As already noted, the two fundamental
partisan gerrymandering tools are to make the opposing party’s districts
highly inefficient and to make one’s own party’s districts efficient. These
twin tactics are familiarly termed “packing” and “cracking.” A third tactic—
what Samuel Issacharoff and Pamela Karlan label “shacking”—involves
“redrawing the lines to place the residences of two incumbents in the same
district, thereby forcing at least one of them out of office.”328 Given the
traditionally recognized state interest in protecting and enhancing its
influence in the national legislature by protecting its congressional
incumbents, partisanship is overwhelmingly likely to be at work whenever a
party uses its control of the state redistricting process to shack incumbents
from the opposing party. Disparate shacking, therefore, serves as a natural
predicate for the construction of a sensible decision rule. One such rule, for
example, could direct courts to presume constitutionally excessive
partisanship whenever a challenged plan adopted by a single-party controlled
legislature shacks more incumbents from the out party than incumbents from
the in party.
V.

Conclusion

Despite the splintering it produced, the Court’s decision in Vieth v.
Jubelirer announces clearly that excessive partisanship in redistricting is
unconstitutional. The remaining challenge, accordingly, is to craft judicially
manageable standards to administer this constitutional norm. Unfortunately,
the difficulty of the task is commensurate with its importance.
For those, like Justice Kennedy, who are prepared to take the challenge
seriously, the first step must be to make clearer what we mean by excessive
partisanship. Remarkably, though, legal scholars and political scientists have
generally overlooked this need in their rush to formulate manageable tests.
Votes-to-seat ratios, S-curves, swing ratios, and compactness measures might
or might not be judicially administrable. But they are assuredly irrelevant
unless they bear upon what it means for a redistricting to be infected by
excessive partisanship, in the constitutionally relevant sense.
However, before we can even take a stab at articulating the line that
separates permissible amounts or degrees of partisanship from excessive
evidence regarding what it claims an electoral map untainted by partisan motivation would have
looked like.
328. Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 181, at 552.
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amounts, we must first conceptualize partisanship as something that can exist
in amounts or degrees. We need, that is, to conceptualize partisanship in
redistricting in scalar, not just binary, terms. This Article has identified four
conceptually and practically distinct scalar notions of partisanship, and has
argued in favor of one of the four—one that employs an ends-based measure
and a counterfactual baseline. It follows that the best sense to be made of
excessive partisanship is this: A districting scheme manifests excessive
partisanship, hence is unconstitutional, if the controlling party is trying to
grab too many more seats than it would likely receive under the plan it would
have adopted had it not considered partisanship at all. This conception of
excessive partisanship does not rely upon proportional representation or
principles of “fair” districting.
To nail down what we mean by excessive partisanship is a critical step
in the project of implementing Vieth, but only the first. Courts must then
craft manageable doctrine to administer this understanding. Put in terms I
have proposed, courts must announce one or more constitutional “decision
rules” to implement this fleshed-out understanding of constitutional meaning.
This Article has proposed several decision rules that could fit the bill. In so
doing, it has demonstrated, I hope, that courts can manage gerrymandering—
adequately, not, to be sure, perfectly. In denying that this was possible, the
four Vieth Justices who would have held claims of partisan gerrymandering
nonjusticiable were, as Justice Kennedy suspected, precipitous.
But it is not essential that the Supreme Court ultimately sanction any
one of the particular decision rules here advanced. More important is that the
Court clearly conceptualize both excessive partisanship (as a ban on an
excessive pursuit of partisan advantage relative to what advantage would
have accrued to the dominant party “naturally,” which is to say,
counterfactually) and the logical structure of constitutional adjudication (as
consisting of judge-interpreted constitutional meanings and judge-crafted
decision rules that direct judges how to determine whether those meanings
have been complied with). If the Court does these things, then the stage will
be set for lower courts, aided by scholars and litigants, to craft decision rules
that can sensibly manage the constitutional command that all nine Justices
recognized in Vieth: States may not pursue excessive partisanship in
redistricting.

